Erich Kretschmann as a proto-logical-empiricist: Adventures and misadventures of the point-coincidence argument by Giovanelli, M.
Author's personal copy
Erich Kretschmann as a proto-logical-empiricist: Adventures and
misadventures of the point-coincidence argument
Marco Giovanelli
Universita¨t Tu¨bingen, Philosophisches Seminar, Bursagasse 1, 72070 Tu¨bingen, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 30 October 2012
Accepted 21 November 2012
Keywords:
Erich Kretschmann
Point coincidence argument
Moritz Schlick
General relativity
Logical empiricism
Conventionalism
a b s t r a c t
The present paper attempts to show that a 1915 article by Erich Kretschmann must be credited not only
for being the source of Einstein’s point-coincidence, but also for having anticipated the main lines of the
logical-empiricist interpretation of general relativity. Whereas Kretschmann was inspired by the work
of Mach and Poincare´, Einstein inserted Kretschmann’s point-coincidence parlance into the context of
Ricci and Levi-Civita’s absolute differential calculus. Kretschmann himself realized this and turned the
point-coincidence argument against Einstein in his second and more famous 1918 paper. While
Einstein had taken nothing from Kretschmann but the expression ‘‘point-coincidences’’, the logical
empiricists, however, instinctively dragged along with it the entire apparatus of Kretschmann’s
conventionalism. Disappointingly, in their interpretation of general relativity, the logical empiricists
unwittingly replicated some epistemological remarks Kretschmann had written before general
relativity even existed.
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1. Introduction
In the early 1980s, Stachel (1980) and Norton (1984) famously
shed new light on Einstein’s celebrated, yet somewhat cryptic,
claim that all physical measurements amount to a determination
of space–time coincidences, such as the matching of a pointer
with a scale, or, if the world consisted of nothing but particles in
motion, the meetings of their world-lines.
In Einstein’s published writings, this remark—which Stachel
has successfully labeled the ‘‘point-coincidence argument’’—a-
mounts to the requirement of ‘‘general covariance’’: since all
coordinate systems necessarily agree on coincidences, that is, in
everything observable, there is no reason to privilege one coordi-
nate system over another. However, Stachel and Norton’s archival
work on Einstein’s private correspondence unmistakably showed
that he had introduced the argument in order to identify the
fallacy that lurked in his now overwhelmingly famous ‘‘hole
argument’’: solutions of the field equations that differ only by a
coordinate transformation agree on point-coincidences—that is,
on everything observable—and thus they represent the same
physical situation.
This ‘‘discovery’’ has revolutionized the historiographical work
on the genesis of general relativity (cf. the volumes of the series
Einstein Studies edited by Howard and Stachel and the monu-
mental Renn, 2007, for a recent overall presentation) and engen-
dered a vast and animated debate about its philosophical
interpretation that, to this day, has shown no signs of exhaustion
(cf. for instance Rickles, 2008, chap. 5, for an effective overview).
Another unintended, but no less important consequence of this
extensive historical work was to drastically change our percep-
tion of early Logical Empiricism. Einstein’s ‘‘public’’ point-
coincidence remark in his 1916 review paper had been previously
regarded as ‘‘the beginnings of the empiricist and verificationist
interpretation of science characteristic of later positivism’’
(Friedman, 1983, but see Friedman, 1999, p. 39; note 22). During
the 1990s, a time of renewed interest in the emergence of logical-
empiricist interpretation of general relativity (Friedman, 1999;
Giere & Richardson, 1996; Howard, 1994), historical scholarship
had an easy time showing that Einstein’s point-coincidence
argument, considered in the correct setting, could hardly nurture
logical empiricists’ eagerness ‘‘to find heroic precursors’’ (Howard,
1996, 121) of their verification theory of meaning.
Ryckman (1992) pointed out that the logical empiricists’ ‘‘more
geometrico interpretation of the point-coincidence remark’’
(Ryckman, 1992, 477) was ‘‘no more congenial y than a left shoe
to a right foot’’ (Ryckman, 1992, 496). The truly philosophically
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revolutionary achievement of general relativity cannot be located in
the fact-convention opposition—which was after all a sort of varia-
tion of the old Kantian form-content opposition—but precisely in
the opposing idea that space and time have no reality independent
of the matter or fields within them (Ryckman, 1992). Howard (1999)
suggested that the logical empiricists had failed to ‘‘distinguish in
principle unobservable, infinitesimal point coincidences from obser-
vable, finite pointer coincidences’’ (Howard, 1999, 493); Einstein
considered ‘‘coincidences’’ as physically real ‘‘by virtue of their
invariance properties’’, not because they are directly observable
(Howard, 1999, 494). Thus also the classical observable-theoretical
dichotomy—another watermark of Logical Empiricism—cannot be
considered a consequence of Einstein’s argument.
The present paper intends to make a contribution to the
history of the logical-empiricist misinterpretation of the point-
coincidence argument, starting with a historical episode that, as
far I can see, has been neglected among historians of the
philosophy of science. In the early 1990s Howard and Norton, in
a seminal paper (Howard & Norton, 1993) dedicated mainly to the
correspondence between Einstein and Paul Hertz (cf. Section 2.3),
suggested in passing that an article written by a then-unknown
school teacher Erich Kretschmann might have been the unac-
knowledged source of Einstein’s point-coincidence remark (cf. also
Janssen, 2007).
Erich Justus Kretschmann (born in Berlin in 1887) had just
gotten his doctorate under the guidance of Max Planck by
attempting to provide a Lorentz-covariant theory of gravitation
(Kretschmann, 1914; see Section 2.1). In December 1915 he
published a two-part paper with a certain epistemological flavor
(Kretschmann, 1915), in which, by relying on the work of Henri
Poincare´ and Ernst Mach, he argued that only ‘‘topological’’
relations encoded in point-coincidences are directly accessible
to experience (Section 3). It was only shortly after the paper was
distributed that Einstein started to use the expression ‘‘point-
coincidences’’ in private correspondence with Paul Ehrenfest,
Michele Besso and Hendrik Lorentz, in order to convince them
that solutions of the field-equations that differ only by a coordi-
nate transformation are physically equivalent (Section 2). Einstein
then abruptly inserted the argument into the quite different
mathematical tradition that had culminated in Ricci and Levi-
Civita’s absolute differential calculus (Section 4). Kretschmann
himself swiftly realized this, and in August 1917 he turned the
public version of the point-coincidence argument against Einstein
in a paper that would make him famous (Kretschmann, 1918;
Section 6).
Considered from this perspective, there is indeed a seldom
noticed ‘‘ironical attachment’’ to the logical-empiricist reception
of general relativity: in the attempt to unravel the philosophical
implications of Einstein’s point-coincidence remarks, the found-
ing fathers of Logical Empiricism unwittingly ended up repeating
the philosophical reflections entailed in a minor paper that an
obscure Gymnasiallehrer had written before general relativity
even appeared (Section 5). Kretschmann must be credited not
only for having possibly suggested to Einstein the expression
‘‘point coincidences’’; he also anticipated with astonishing clair-
voyance the main lines of the philosophy of space and time that
Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolph Carnap managed
to the transform in the 1920s into the only credible philosophical
approach to Einstein’s new theory of gravitation (Ryckman, 2005,
chap. 3). The fact/convention and observable/theoretical distinc-
tion and their entanglement with the topological/metrical oppo-
sition have a much more humble lineage than the logical
empiricists were inclined to believe (Section 8).
As we will try to show, Kretschmann’s ‘‘Proto-Logical-Empir-
cism’’ provides a clue as to why, in the 1920s, the logical empiricists’
reading of the point-coincidence argument was so irresistibly
convincing, while now it seems irremediably implausible. At the
time, philosophically informed readers could not resist the sort of
‘‘Pavlovian reaction’’ of considering the language of ‘‘coincidences’’
as the heir of the tradition from which Kretschmann had taken it,
namely, from the familiar work of authors such as Helmholtz,
Poincare´ and Mach, etc. The context of the work of Riemann,
Christoffel and Ricci in which Einstein had inserted Kretschmann’s
parlance was far too detached from the main issues of the
philosophical debate at the time to be taken into consideration.
Despite conventional wisdom, the claim that only point-
coincidences are physically significant could only be properly
understood by reading it out of context. When Kretschmann,
inspired by Mach and Poincare´, resorted to this turn of phrase he
was pointing out the ‘‘scarcity’’ of mathematical structure to
which experience and observation have access. On the contrary,
Einstein, by appropriating Kretschmann’s wording, was dealing
with an uncomfortable ‘‘abundance’’ of mathematically different
solutions to the field equations that was allowed by Ricci and
Levi-Civita’s mathematical technique (Section 4).
To the logical empiricists, by unconsciously reading Einstein’s
point-coincidence argument as Kretschmann had originally pre-
sented it, general relativity indeed appeared to deprive physical
reality of all but ‘‘topological’’ properties of the coordinate
system. Yet, if any philosophical implication can be attributed
to Einstein’s theory, it is precisely the denial that the bare
coordinate system, with its mere ‘‘topological’’ properties, has
any independent physical reality. It has only been since the mid-
fifties that Peter Bergmann—Einstein’s former assistant at Prin-
ceton—restored the spirit of Einstein’s notion of ‘‘coincidence’’, by
redefining the notion of what is ‘‘conventional’’ and what is truly
‘‘observable’’ in general relativity in a way the philosophical
debate has only much later come to appreciate (Section 9).
2. Einstein before Kretschmann: Einstein’s famous argument
against general covariance
As is well known, in as early as 1913, after having become
familiar with Ricci and Levi-Civita’s ‘‘absolute differential calcu-
lus’’ (Levi-Civita & Ricci-Curbastro, 1900; cf. Reich, 1994), Einstein
and Marcel Grossmann were able to outline a theory of gravita-
tion based on the expression ds2 ¼ P gmn dxm dxn; the coefficients
gmn represented the numbers by which one has to multiply
coordinate differences in order to get real distances as well as
the potentials of the gravitational field at a certain point (Einstein
& Grossmann, 1913). Einstein and Grossmann were clear from the
beginning that the differential equations for determining the
quantities gmn, given the distribution of matter and energy—a
generally covariant analogon of Poisson’s second-order partial
differential equation of the gravitational potential—‘‘would likely
have the form k Ymn ¼Gmn, where k is a constant’’ (Einstein &
Grossmann, 1913, 11).1
As is well known, Grossmann had easily found that the four-
index object (ik,lm) (known as the Riemann–Christoffel tensor) is
the only tensor that contains only the first and second derivatives
of the fundamental tensor (cf. Zurich Notebook, p. 14L; CPAE 4,
Dco. 10. However, the difficulties in finding a suitable two-index
contraction of the Riemann tensor that could be equated to the
matter tensor Ymn (Maltese, 1991; Norton, 2007) forced Einstein
and Grossmann to publish field equations that were only covar-
iant with respect to linear transformations: an embarrassing
result for a theory that intended to extend the relativity principle
1 For the sake of historical accuracy, in the course of the paper I will give all
formulas in the original notation.
M. Giovanelli / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (2013) 115–134116
Author's personal copy
to all motions by including non-linear transformations of the
coordinates. As Einstein admitted on 13 August 1913 in a letter to
Lorentz: ‘‘the theory refutes its own starting point and is left
hanging in the air’’ (CPAE 5, Doc. 467).
Einstein seems to have become interested at this point in
showing that the generally covariant field equations he was
unable to find were actually impossible. Einstein’s argument
against general covariance has become enormously famous over
the last three decades and has therefore been discussed many
times in historical (Norton, 1984, Section 5; Stachel, 1980,
Sections 3 and 4), philosophical (Earman, 1989, chap. 9; Earman
& Norton, 1987) and physical literature (Rovelli, 2004, Section
2.2.5). I will provide a rapid overview here, with the aim of
introducing some elements that will turn out to be relevant to
understanding why Einstein, in late 1915, suddenly became
attracted by Kretschmann’s point-coincidence language.
2.1. The lack of Eindeutigkeit of generally covariant field equations
Einstein might have already developed the seeds of an argu-
ment against general covariance by the end of August 1913 in a
discussion with Michele Besso (Janssen, 2007). In some notes in a
manuscript know as the Besso-Memo (Janssen, 2003), Besso
imagines a central mass surrounded by empty space, arguing
that, due to the arbitrary choice of the coordinate system, the field
equations, together with boundary conditions, do not guarantee
‘‘a unique determinability of the g’s’’ in the empty region. Besso
suggested that this might not be a problem, since only observable
phenomena, such as the motion of particles, should be deter-
mined uniquely. Einstein, however, rejected Besso’s move as an
escape ‘‘of no use’’; the new solution K2 in the coordinate system
2—he argues—‘‘is also a solution in 1’’ (Besso Memo p. 2; quoted
and translated in Janssen, 2007; see Fig. 2 on p. 789, for a
facsimile of this passage; see also Renn & Sauer, 2007, 241). With
this remark—which will turn out to be essential—Einstein prob-
ably wanted to show that the trajectories of particles determined
by the transformed solution K2 will appear different with respect
to the original coordinate system 1.
In a footnote of his Vienna lecture, delivered on September
1913, Einstein already hints that he had just found ‘‘a proof that
such a generally covariant solution to the problem cannot exist at
all’’ (Einstein, 1913). A similar statement can be found in a letter
to Ludwig Hopf on 2nd November of the same year (CPAE, Vol. 5,
Doc. 480). Some days later Einstein explained more explicitly to
his friend Ehrenfest—who in 1912 had succeeded Lorentz as
professor of theoretical physics at Leiden (Huijnen & Kox,
2007)—that generally covariant field equations cannot achieve
‘‘a unique determination [eindeutige Bestimmung] of the gmn out
of the Tmn’’; this ‘‘is only possible if special coordinate systems are
chosen’’ (CPAE 5, Doc. 484).
To avoid the issue of the additional boundary conditions,
Einstein might have inverted Besso’s model by imagining an
empty region surrounded by matter—hence the label Lochbe-
trachtung, ‘‘hole argument’’, by which the argument is usually
known. The argument was first published in this form on 30
January 1914 in an addendum to a reprint of the Entwurf in the
Zeitschrift fur Mathematik und Physik (Einstein & Grossmann,
1914a). Einstein famously considered a region L (which probably
stands for Loch) of the ‘‘four-dimensional manifold’’, where no
material process occurs, that is, ‘‘where the Ymn vanish’’. Given a
solution gmn of the field equations within L, the general covariance
of the equations allows us to introduce a new coordinate-system
x0m, that coincides with the original coordinate system xn at
the boundary of L (Einstein & Grossmann, 1914a, 260). In the
primed coordinates the transformed field gmn is a solution to the
transformed field equations that, in general, is different from the
one in the first coordinate system. Einstein concludes that ‘‘more
than one system of gmn pertains to the system Ymn’’ (Einstein &
Grossmann, 1914a, 260; my emphasis). Gravitational field equa-
tions doo not uniquely determine the metric tensor representing
the gravitational field.
Interestingly, Kretschmann also formulates the argument
similarly in his dissertation Eine Theorie der Schwerkraft in Rahmen
der Urspru¨nglichen Einsteinen Relativita¨tstheorie (submitted before
January 1914, when the oral examination took place). Kretsch-
mann points out that Einstein’s theory—where ‘‘in place of the
scalar potential ten components of a tensor appear’’—had
encountered a fundamental difficulty: ‘‘Mr. Einstein was not able
to find a generally invariant form for the differential equations
that determine the gravitational field [Schwerfeld] through state
quantities of matters’’ (Kretschmann, 1914, 15); his equations,
Kretschmann noticed, are only invariant against linear transfor-
mations. Kretschmann interestingly claimed that any attempt to
proceed further ‘‘must necessarily fail’’, because in a generally
covariant theory ‘‘the components of the matter tensor may
identically vanish in a certain part of the four-dimensional world
y but not gmn of the gravitational potentials’’ (Kretschmann,
1914, 15; my emphasis).
2.2. A new field on an old coordinate system
The lack of Eindeutigkeit (cf. Howard, 1991, for the philoso-
phical background of this term) of the generally covariant
field equations in this formulation looks like a trivial mistake
(Pais, 1982, 222). Actually, ‘‘we expect the components of a tensor
to change when the coordinates are changed’’ (Hoffmann, 1982,
101); it is practically the first thing one learns in studying the
absolute differential calculus. The Riemann–Christoffel tensor
furnishes a univocal mathematical criterion for establishing when
the difference of two set of gmn has, so to speak, substance, and
when it is an artifact of the coordinate system chosen.
A more recent reading of the argument (Norton, 1984; Stachel,
1980) has confirmed that Einstein (and Grossmann) might not be
charged with such naivety. The clue here is usually considered to
be a remark added in a successive version of the argument,
written in January 1914 and published on the Physikalische
Zeitschrift in 15 February 1914 (Einstein, 1914b). Einstein argues
again that even if Tmn ¼T0mn outside the hole, in general, inside
the hole one might find that gmnag
0
mn (Einstein, 1914b, 178).
In footnote (1), however, he points out that ‘‘the independent
variables xn on the left side of the equation must be attributed the
same numerical values of x0n on the left side’’ (Einstein, 1914b,
178; footnote).
This point—which, as we have seen, Einstein had already made
in the Besso memo—still did not come out clearly in a successive
version of the argument (Einstein & Grossmann, 1914b, 218).
However, it became central in the now famous y 12 of Einstein’s
systematic presentation of the Entwurf-theory that was presented
on 29 October 1914 before the Prussian Academy of Sciences: Die
formale Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie (Einstein,
1914a). Einstein symbolically defined a system of gmn as functions
of the coordinates as G(x). Using this non-standard notation,
Einstein makes it clear that the field equations, by means of a
coordinate transformation, appear to attribute different field
quantities G(x) and G0ðxÞ to the same world-point (position-plus-
instant-in-time), identified via the same unprimed coordinate
system x inside the hole for the same distribution of matter Tmn
outside it.
The principle of general covariance appears, then, to be
incompatible with physical causality in the loose sense that the
same ‘‘cause’’, the same Tmn, seems to produce different ‘‘effects’’,
or different values of the gmn at the same point. In the case of
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electrostatic, for example, it would of course be unacceptable if
the field equation, given the same charge distribution, attributed
different values of the potentials to the same point, and thus
predicted different trajectories for charged particles. In y 13 of his
October 1914 Sitzungsbericht, Einstein insisted therefore that—in
order to ensure a unique relation between gmn and Tmn—the class
of admissible coordinate systems must be restricted ‘‘to justified’’
transformation between so-called ‘‘adapted coordinates’’
(Einstein, 1914a, 1066ff.; cf. Norton, 1984, Section 6).
2.3. The new meaning of the Eindeutigkeit requirement
In January 1915 Lorentz objected to Einstein that by introdu-
cing his ‘‘adapted coordinates’’, he had violated the very premise
of general relativity, that is, the idea that no preferred coordinate
system can be assumed in advance (CPAE 8a, Doc. 43, 70). In his
reply, Einstein argued that the ‘‘adapted coordinates systems’’ do
not say anything about the geometrical structure of ‘‘spacetime’’,
but only about the choice of the coordinate system in an
otherwise arbitrarily given space–time (CPAE 8a, Doc. 43, 70).
On both a plane and a sphere orthogonal coordinates might be
used (Cartesian coordinates and latitude and longitude are both
orthogonal coordinates). The requirement that the coordinate
must be, e.g. orthogonal does not say anything about the geome-
try of the surface (see also Einstein, 1914c, 348).
Einstein’s ‘‘Gaussian’’ parlance shows that he was concerned
with the ominous presence of a redundancy allowed by the
formalism of absolute differential calculus. Einstein’s initial reac-
tion was to restrict our freedom to relabel the space–time
coordinates in order to save the theory’s predictability. In August
1915, the Go¨ttinger Physicist Paul Hertz (cf. Howard and Norton,
1993), resorting again to Gauss’s notation, may have suggested to
Einstein that such a redundancy might not have been a problem
at all. The apparently different solutions of the field equations
considered by Einstein—a point that will turn out to be relevant
in the following—are simply ‘‘developable’’ onto each other.
They can be deduced from one another by a deformation that
preserves all lengths and thus represents the same space–time
geometry. Einstein was, however, not really convinced by Hertz’s
argument: ‘‘So once again: I would not think of requiring that
the world should be ‘developable onto itself,’ and I do not under-
stand how you require such a dreadful [so etwas fu¨rchterliches]
thing of me’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 108, 161; tr. in Howard & Norton,
1993, 46).
Hertz’s suggestion probably reflects a familiarity in the use of
arbitrary coordinates, which might have been widespread in the
Go¨ttingen community formed around David Hilbert (Brading &
Ryckman, 2008; Howard & Norton, 1993), who, at about that time
had started to work intensively on Einstein’s theory (Einstein had
just visited Go¨ttingen between June and July of 1915; Corry,
2003). It is hard to establish precisely when Einstein came
to realize that two sets of coefficients which are ‘‘developable
onto another’’—that is, that differ only by a coordinate
transformation—represent the same physical situation.
However, under the pressure of competing with Hilbert
(Brading & Ryckman, 2008; Earman & Glymour, 1978; Mehra,
1974; Renn & Stachel, 2007; Sauer, 1999), by November 1915
Einstein had regained general covariance for the field (Janssen &
Renn, 2007; Norton, 1984; Pais, 1982; Renn & Sauer, 2007) which
he presented in four communications to the Prussian Academy
(Einstein, 1915a, 1915b, 1915c, 1915d): ‘‘a real triumph of the
method of the general differential calculus founded by Gauss,
Riemann, Christoffel, Ricci, and Levi-Civiter [sic]’’ (Einstein,
1915d, 778), as Einstein famously put it.
As the so-called perihelion paper (published on 25 November)
most clearly reveals, Einstein was suddenly ready to accept that
‘‘the gmn’’, for the given mass distribution, are ‘‘not yet mathemati-
cally fully determined’’ through the field equations, which allow an
entire class of different solutions that differ only by a coordinate
transformation: ‘‘One may be justified, however, in assuming that
all of these solutions can be reduced to one another by means of such
transformations, and that (for the given boundary conditions) they
therefore differ from one another only formally, but not physically’’
(Einstein, 1915a, 832). Different sets of gmn that differ only by a
coordinate transformation are mathematically different, but repre-
sent the same physical situation; their difference is only an artifact
of the coordinate system chosen. Einstein now considered it fully
acceptable ‘‘to obtain a solution without considering the question
whether or not it is the only unique possibility’’ (Einstein, 1915a, 832;
tr, Howard, 1996, 467; my emphasis).
On 14 December 1915 Einstein could then proudly announce
to Schlick—who had just sent him his paper on special relativity
(Schlick, 1915)—his ‘‘newly found result’’: a theory, whose gen-
erally covariant equations, has deprived space and time of the
‘‘last vestige of physical objectivity’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 165, 221).
Einstein, however, might have felt he owed an explanation to his
friends and correspondents, such as Ehrenfest, who over the
previous two years he had insistently tried to convince that
covariant field equations were impossible precisely due to their
lack of univocalness or Eindetutigkeit. It was at the end of 1915
that, from an unexpected source, Einstein may have found an apt
‘‘rhetorical device’’ to escape from his own argument against
general covariance.
3. Kretschmann’s early point-coincidence argument
On 15 October 1915 Kretschmann—at the time a substitute
teacher in a Ko¨nigsberg Gymnasium—had finished writing a rather
convoluted paper in two parts, which was entitled: U¨ber die
prinzipielle Bestimmbarkeit der berechtigten Bezugssysteme beliebiger
Relativita¨tstheorien (Kretschmann, 1915). The Annalen der Physik
received Kretschmann’s first post-doctoral paper on 21 October
1915. The paper contained, among others things, an argument
that—unbeknownst to its inventor—would enjoy an enormous
popularity in the history of physics and philosophy of science, but
also, as we shall see, would give rise to a long series of serious
misunderstandings:
Each measurement of spatiotemporal quantities, such as
length, time, volume, speed etc., is performed in a way that
certain material or immaterial parts (i.e. light rays) of the
measuring instrument are completely or only partially brought
to spatiotemporal superposition with parts of the object to
measure. The result of measurements is obtained by trans-
porting the given spatiotemporal measure-relations between
the parts of the measuring instrument and those of the
measured object, with which they have been brought to
superposition. What is observed here—if we neglect, at first, all
direct quantiative estimates [Gro¨ßenscha¨tzung]—is only the com-
plete or partial spatiotemporal coincidence [Zusammenfallen] or
non-coincidence [Nichtzusammenfallen] of parts of the measur-
ing instrument with parts of the measured object. Or more
generally: topological relations between spatiotemporally
extended objectsyIn as much as the spatiotemporal relations
consist in measure-relations among spatiotemporal quantities,
they cannot be traced back to purely observational facts, even
by checking the given measuring instruments through other
instruments. Exclusively new topological relations are
observed again (Kretschmann, 1915, 914f.).
Kretschmann readily admits that he came to this conclusion by
resorting to ‘‘E. Mach’s and H. Poincare´’s analyses of physical
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experience’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 911). According to Kretsch-
mann, Mach and Poincare´ have shown ‘‘that it [the experience]
can deliver only spatiotemporal relations of topological nature
[von bestimmtenra¨umlich-zeitlichen Beziehungen nur solche
topologischer Art liefern kann]’’, i.e. precisely the relations of
coincidence or non-coincidence of points (Kretschmann, 1915,
911). On the contrary, according to Kretschmann, ‘‘all topologi-
cally independent measure-determinations [Maßbestimmungen]
of spatiotemporal quantities should be regarded as empir-
ically unprovable results of physical theories’’ (Kretschmann,
1915, 911).
Kretschmann must have had some interest in philosophy. In
the brief Lebenslauf, which is included in his dissertation, he
claims to have attended (among those of many others) the
lectures of Alois Riehl in Berlin (Kretschmann, 1914, backcover),
who, in his widely read monograph on Kant, also used the
language of coincidences to explain the origin of our space
representation (cf. Riehl, 1876–1887, vol. 2, part I, 145 (1879);
see also Riehl, 1908–1926, vol. 2, 175 (1925)). Kretschmann’s
sources are highly interesting from a historical-philosophical
point of view; it is worth paying some attention to the passages
to which Kretschmann explicitly refers us:
 Ernst Mach, Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Leipzig 1906 (actually
Mach, 1905). In particular Kretschmann mentions the
chapters: ‘‘Der physiologische Raum im Gegensatz zum
metrischen’’, pp. 337ff., and ‘‘Die physiologische Zeit im
Gegensatz zur metrischen’’, pp. 423ff. Here Mach claims that,
starting from the information provided by our senses, ‘‘one
could build at most a topology’’. The physiological space and
the geometrical space are in fact profoundly different; how-
ever, they have a few qualities in common: ‘‘Both spaces are
threefold manifoldnesses. To every point of geometric space
A,B,C,D . . . corresponds a point A0,B0,C 0,D0 . . . of the physiologi-
cal space. If C lies between B and D, there is also C 0 between
B0 and D0’’ (Mach, 1905, 337; tr. Mach, 1906, 11). In particular
Kretschmann read Mach in the sense that experience can only
provide univocal information about the ‘‘contact’’ or non-
contact of bodies—also distant perceptions (such as sight
and hearing) can be at least reduced to the sensation of
contact—and nothing else.
 H. Poincare´, Wissenschaft und Hypothese, Leipzig 1906
(Poincare´, 1906a, German translation of Poincare´, 1902), part
2, chap. 4 and 5, p. 52ff., Letzte Gedanken, Leipzig 1913
(Poincare´, 1913b, German translation of Poincare´, 1913a),
chap. 2 and 3, p. 33ff; Der Wert der Wissenschaft, Leipzig
1906 (Poincare´, 1906b, German translation of Poincare´, 1905,
chap. 2 u. 3, p. 26ff). In particular, Kretschmann seems to be
interested in Poincare´’s claim that space, when considered
independently of our measuring instruments, has only topolo-
gical properties (that is, those studied in analysis situs), but it is
deprived of any metric or even projective structure. ‘‘It is
amorphous, that is, it does not differ from any space which one
can derive from it by any continuous deformation whatever’’
(Poincare´, 1913b, 60; Fr. orig. Poincare´, 1913a, 62; Eng. tr.
Poincare´, 1963, 27), since bodies that are in ‘‘contact’’ before
the transformation will still be in contact after the transforma-
tion. Poincare´ translated this intuitive way of thinking in the
abstract language of coordinates. The contact that, let’s say, the
finger feels when it touches an object, means that at a certain
time t the coordinates x, y,z are the same for both the finger
and for the object: x¼ x0, y¼ y0, z¼ z0 (Poincare´, 1913b, 60;
Fr. orig. Poincare´, 1913a, 83; Eng. tr. Poincare´, 1963, 83).
The analysis situs or topology considered indistinguishable
those spaces that are mapped into each other so that x0,y0,z0
are three continuous functions whatever of x, y, and z. In his
more technical papers, published at the turn of the century,
Poincare´ had made clear that these functions must ‘‘have
continuous derivatives’’ (Poincare´, 1895, 198). Poincare´
labeled such transformations ‘‘homeomorphisms’’ (Poincare´,
1895, Section 2) whereas we would rather speak of ‘‘diffeo-
morphisms’’ (cf. Moore, 2007). The set of such transformations
forms a group that is ‘‘one of the most general which can be
imagined’’, which Poincare´—in a parlance somewhat different
from ours—considered the object of the analysis situs or
topology.
Kretschmann’s strategy is then fairly simple: he extended Mach
and Poincare´’s insistence on the ‘‘topological’’ determinacy and
metrical amorphousness of space to the four-dimensional frame-
work (see of course Minkowski, 1909, but also Poincare´, 1906c),
that was by that time fully implemented in the physical literature.
Kretschmann’s premises are the following:
 In order to be free from ‘‘every presupposition of a given form a
priori of spatial intuition’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 916f.), Kretsch-
mann considered a ‘‘spatiotemporal physical system of reference
[Bezugssystem der Physik] as a—four-dimensional—manifold of
pure numbers’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 917). Kretschmann is com-
mitted to the idea that space–time is the set of all possible
quadruples of real numbers; a world-point is a quadruple of real
numbers, etc. The neighborhood relations among world-points
can be expressed in a rigorous way, without resorting to
geometrical intuition: events that coincide are assigned the same
quadruple of coordinate numbers and adjacent events corre-
spond to adjacent values of the coordinates (Kretschmann, 1915,
Sections 5, 6 & 22). The set-theoretical definition of ‘‘neighbor-
hood’’ (Hilbert, 1902, 234–235; Hilbert, 1903, app. IV, 122–123.)
via the notion of ‘‘open set’’ (Weyl, 1913, 11f.) and the separ-
ability axiom (Hausdorff, 1914, 214f.) was still considered avant-
garde at that time (e.g. Study, 1914 still resorts to the definition
of a manifold as a number manifold).
 Kretschmann recognizes the necessity of introducing what he
calls ‘‘mapping postulates [Abbildungspostulate]’’ (Kretschmann,
1915, 918) to assure law-like connections between the abstract
number-manifold and the empirical world: ‘‘If the space–time
coordinates are nothing else than a system of pure numbers’’
then ‘‘there is no connection a priori between them and some
magnitudes of the empirical space and the empirical time’’
(Kretschmann, 1915, 917).
Such ‘‘mapping prescriptions [Abbildungsvorschriften]’’ (a) must
be independent from a space and time location as well as from
the particular condition of the observer. (Kretschmann 1915,
918) (b) must reproduce the ‘‘same topological properties and
relations’’ (number of dimensions, type of connection etc.) of the
phenomenal world (Erscheinungswelt) in ‘‘the system and mani-
fold of pure (coordinates)-numbers’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 918f.)
In order to achieve this result, Kretschmann assumes that it is
legitimate to systematically substitute observable finite point-
coincidences with infinitesimal point-coincidences, that is, to
assume that ‘‘all topological observations are valid with absolute
exactness and sharpness’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 912; cf. Section
15). This implies ‘‘the elimination of the unavoidable complica-
tions that arise from the interpretation of macroscopic observa-
tions in the light of an atomic theory of matter’’ (Kretschmann,
1915, 912; cf. Section 80).
Given these premises, Kretschmann argues that ‘‘the most
general and the most fundamental law for the mapping of the
world on the reference system’’ is the following: ‘‘starting from
topological observations’’ one can only establish that ‘‘all points
of the phenomenal world constitute a simply connected manifold2
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of exactly four spatiotemporal dimensions’’ (Kretschmann, 1915,
924).
Kretschmann must have sensed that he was somehow begging
the question; one can reach the conclusion that such a weak
topological structure is accessible to experience only by resorting
to ‘‘principles that are not empirically provable [empirisch doch nicht
erweisbarer Sa¨tze]’’, that is ‘‘the mapping postulates’’ (Kretschmann,
1915, 911); so it is not clear if experience ‘‘discovers’’ the topological
structure of the world, or, as a Kantian might have objected, if this
structure has been put into experience via the mapping postulates.
However, Kretschmann, after having recognized the impossi-
bility of eliminating every non-empirical element from his
analysis (Kretschmann, 1915, 919f.), could congratulate himself
for having showed that observation provides at most topological
information about the phenomenal world—that is, information
about the coincidence or non-coincidence of points—and nothing
more. Everything else—in particular ‘‘[s] patial–temporal measure
relations’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 924)—are ‘‘inaccessible to obser-
vation’’ and ‘‘go beyond what can be controlled through observa-
tion’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 924).
Consequently, two mappings of the world that can be
smoothly deformed onto one another by distorting the lengths
of lines and the angles between them, while preserving point-
coincidences, are empirically indistinguishable:
The line of thought [Gedankengang] just presented can be briefly
summarized as follows: Each statement about spatiotemporal
measure-relations—apparently gained by mere observation—can
be interpreted as the expression of purely qualitative topological
observational facts, which have been arranged in a simple
form by the (unconscious) addition of quantitative theoretical
assumptions. If one accepts this interpretation, it follows that in
no case, through mere observation, can a soundly based decision
be made between two qualitatively different but topologically
identical mappings of the world of appearance onto a space–
time reference system (Kretschmann, 1915, 916).
The topological relations of space–time to which experience has
access are not rich enough and do not furnish any sufficient reason to
establish which one of the topologically equivalent but metrically
different mappings of the world is the ‘‘true’’ one: statements that
‘‘cannot be reduced to purely topological relations can be regarded as
mere—or at most methodologically justified [ho¨chstens methodolo-
gisch begru¨ndete]—conventions. However, one cannot say that all
spatiotemporal measure-relations y are conventions. Rather, this
claim only applies to the topologically independent ones among them’’
(Kretschmann, 1915, 924; my emphasis).
This result is most apparent if one considers that every space–
time theory, according to Kretschmann, is characterized by a set
of coordinate transformations that let some ‘‘algebraic expres-
sion’’ (cf. Kretschmann, 1915, Sections S18–21) between coordi-
nates be unchanged when one substitutes the unprimed
coordinates with the primed ones. The set of these transforma-
tions forms a group—for each transformation there exists
an inverse contained in the set, and the composition of any
two transformations of the set in turn belongs to the set
(Kretschmann, 1915, 925; footnote 1). The group of transforma-
tions in which the laws of physics are invariant is decided by the
relativity principle of the theory (probably the most significant of
Kretschmann’s results). A choice among different possible, physi-
cally different relativity theories—that is, theories with laws that
are invariant against some sub-group of the general group of
smooth coordinate transformations—remains under-determined
by the topological structure accessible to experience.
Kretschmann analyzed in detail theories that were character-
ized by a finite-parameter continuous group of transformations:
the absolute theory (which admits an absolute speed respect to
the aether, such as Abraham’s theory; cf. Kretschmann, 1915,
Sections 51–53), the Galilei-Hertz Relativity Theory (which
incorporates Heinrich Hertz’s aether-dragging hypothesis; cf.
Kretschmann, 1915, Section 53) and that of the Lorentz–Einstein
Relativity Theory (with time-dilatation and length-contraction; cf.
Kretschmann, 1915, Sections 58–61). Additionally, Kretschmann
takes into consideration theories based on infinite-parameter
groups of transformations, such as the Mach–Reissner Theory
(a Machian explanation of inertia; cf. Kretschmann, 1915, Section
63) and the ‘‘new Einstein theory’’ (that is, the Entwurf-theory;
cf. Kretschmann, 1915, Section 64), which Kretschmann addresses
only very briefly at the very end of the paper. No mention is made
of Einstein’s argument against general covariance, which, as we
have seen, Kretschmann knew about (see Section 2.1).
Kretschmann’s main concern was in fact totally different: all the
above-listed theories agree on the ‘‘purely topological content verifi-
able through observation [durch Beobachtungen verifizierbaren]’’
(Kretschmann, 1915, 938), that is, they agree on point-coincidences.
All ‘‘topologically independent’’ measure-relations ‘‘can only be
made true by convention’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 939). In particular,
a stipulation about the behavior of what Kretschmann calls ‘‘ideal
instruments’’ (paths of light rays and freely moving bodies, and rigid
bodies and clocks) is needed.
Kretschmann concludes that ‘‘through mere experience (observa-
tion and induction) essentially only topological relations for the deter-
mination of the system of reference can be provided’’ (Kretschmann,
1915, 979), and even then, ‘‘only with the help of certain purely
theoretical propositions, the mapping postulates, that put into rela-
tion the empirical space and the empirical time with the space- and
time-coordinates of theoretical physics’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 979).
Consequently, ‘‘it is not possible to pick out a single [class] of systems
of reference from those that are compatible with the mapping
postulate, that is, from those that can be mapped onto one another
through arbitrary continuous transformations, without resorting to
‘conventional’ theoretical measure-determinations and arbitrary sti-
pulations which go beyond experience’’ (Kretschmann, 1915, 979).
Kretschmann claims that, of all the possible topologically equiva-
lent sets of measure-relations, one can be privileged only by resorting
to ‘‘thought-economical principles’’ [denko¨konomischen Sa¨tze]
Kretschmann, 1915, 982, an undeniably Machian wording (cf. e.g.
Banks, 2003, chap. 8): ‘‘If at all,’’ he argues, ‘‘the (empirically provable)
topological laws of a phenomenon always have to be equipped
[einzukleiden] with measure-relations in the simplest way possible’’
(Kretschmann, 1915, 982). Kretschmann’s epistemology starts to
sound very familiar: In physical theories we can distinguish a factual
element verifiable by experience on which a class of empirically
equivalent theories agree (point-coincidences), and a conventional
element (metric-relations) determined pragmatically as leading to the
‘‘simplest’’ theory in the class. Of course, Kretschmann is aware that it
is hard to say ‘‘how this simplest outfitting [Einkleiden] of topological
laws in metrical relations is in general defined’’ (Kretschmann, 1915,
982, n. 3). However, it is at least undeniable that ‘‘simplicity’’ has
nothing to do with ‘‘truth’’.
4. Einstein After Kretschmann: The ‘‘Private’’ and the ‘‘Public’’
point-coincidence argument
4.1. The ‘‘Private’’ point-coincidence argument
Kretschmann’s paper appeared in the Annalen der Physik on 21
December 1915; on 26 December Einstein wrote a letter to
Ehrenfest which has been referred to in the literature many times2 Roughly a manifold without holes.
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in the last thirty years. Einstein briefly reminded Ehrefenst of the
problem raised in the above-mentioned y 12 of his 1914 Sitzungs-
bericht — the possibility of referring two solutions G(x) and G0ðxÞ
to the same coordinate system x. ‘‘In place of y 12,’’ he continues,
one must introduce the remark that ‘‘[t]he physically real in the
world of events [Weltgeschehen] y consists in spatiotemporal
coincidences [Koinzindenzen]’’—such as ‘‘the intersections of two
different world-lines’’—‘‘and nothing else!’’ (as he added in a
footnote). In particular, ‘‘two systems of the gmn’’ which can be
obtained from one another ‘‘through mere space–time transforma-
tion’’ must be regarded as ‘‘completely equivalent [gleichbedeu-
tend]’’; in fact, ‘‘they have all spatiotemporal point-coincidences in
common, i.e. everything that is observable’’, ‘‘in contrast to that
which is dependent upon the choice of a reference system’’ (CPAE
8, Doc. 173, 228, my emphasis).
Apart from the use of the Latin-rooted word Koizindenz in
place of its Germanic equivalent Zusammenfallen,3 Einstein’s
wording clearly resembles that of Kretschmann’s. It is ‘‘extremely
suggestive’’ (Howard & Norton, 1993, 53) that the argument made
its sudden appearance in this letter to Ehrenfest—dated only five
days after the distribution of Kretschmann’s paper; there is no
trace of it in Einstein’s public and unpublished work before this
date (Howard & Norton, 1993, 53). It is plausible to conjecture,
then, that Einstein deftly modified Kretschmann’s argument
without acknowledging his source in order to justify to his
correspondents that his initial concerns about general covariance
were unfounded.
Einstein has often been accused of reluctance in recognizing
the influence of other scientists on his work.4 However, in this
case, it must be strongly emphasized that Kretschmann’s argu-
ment in Einstein’s hands became something totally different from
its original version. Kretschmann, following Mach and Poincare´,
had been considering space–times that are smoothly deformable
onto each other and thus endowed with different sets of measure-
relations. Lines of the same length may not have equal length after
the transformation; only the ‘‘topological’’ properties, represented
by their points of intersection, remain unchanged.
Einstein, in contrast, inserted Kretschmann’s argument into
the context of Ricci and Levi-Civita’s absolute differential calculus.
He considered two gmn-systems that differ only by a coordinate
transformation, that is, the very same spatiotemporal measure-
relations in different coordinate systems: lines of equal length still
have equal length, angles between them at points of intersection
will remain unchanged, and thus a fortiori the points of intersec-
tion of such lines will also remain unaltered.
This mathematical triviality might however become proble-
matic if one regards the gmn as potentials of a physical field.
In traditional field theories, one usually first covers the space with
a coordinate grid and then distributes the field potentials on it,
from which the possible trajectories of charged particles can be
derived. In general relativity, however, a new set of potentials gmn
may be introduced by virtue of a simply coordinate transforma-
tion. The world-lines of light rays and massive particles that
passed through certain points of the original coordinate grid will
then follow different paths in the transformed field, i.e. will
intersect different grid points.
Put this way, it then becomes understandable why Kretsch-
mann’s point-coincidence remark might have suddenly appeared
to Einstein as a ‘‘godsend’’ (Janssen, 2007, 827). Using Kretsch-
mann’s turn of phrase, one can effectively put a finger on the
conceptual error that lurks in this seemingly plausible reasoning.
As we have seen, in 1913 Besso had already suggested that only
observable phenomena, such as the paths of particles, should be
considered relevant. It might not be mere chance that Einstein
wrote to Besso on 3 January 1916 that it was not the movements
of material points that are observable, but only ‘‘the points of
intersection of their world lines’’. The laws of nature do ‘‘not
determine more than the totality of the spatiotemporal coinci-
dences’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 178, 235).
It is worth lingering on Einstein’s word choice in these famous
passages in order to understand the profound difference between
Kretschmann and Einstein’s versions of the point-coincidence
argument. Of course, it is simply not true that only point-
coincidences are physically relevant in general relativity, and
nothing more than point-coincidences. Two sets of gmn that differ
only by a coordinate transformation obviously agree not only in
such coincidences, but also in the length of world-lines and angles
between them at the point of intersection, in the distinction
between geodesics and non-geodesics, etc. As Hertz had already
pointed out to Einstein in August 1915, the two solutions are
‘‘developable’’ onto one another.
Einstein therefore had come to appreciate Kretschmann’s turn
of phrase, for reasons that have nothing to do with Kretschmann’s
metrical conventionalism. When Einstein maintains that only the
intersections of world-lines have a physical content, he is empha-
sizing that the question of where they intersect is not well-posed.
It is physically meaningless to argue that the path of two world-
lines determined by inter-transformable gmn-sets do not meet at
the same point identified by their coordinates; the same point is
precisely where the two world-lines meet, information that is
‘‘naturally preserved under all transformations’’ (CPAE 8, Doc.
178, 235).
Using Kretschmann’s wording, Einstein could then show his
correspondents pictorially that in general relativity points cannot
be identified by their coordinates independently from the field.
In traditional field theories, if one removes the field potentials the
bare coordinate system remains; in general relativity, by remov-
ing the gmn, nothing is left. The field quantities, that is, the gmn, not
only define the physical field and determine the paths of light
rays and massive particles; they also encode all information about
the coordinate system in which they are presented. The gravita-
tional potentials and the coordinates system are inextricably
entangled in general relativity and one cannot describe one
without the other (cf. Norton, 2005, Section 5.5.3).
The strategy of referring a primed solution of the field
equations too the unprimed coordinate system—as if the latter
had its own independent physical reality—was probably felt as
instinctively correct. As has been shown (Kox, 1987), Lorentz was
also clearly affected by the same prejudice. In a letter to Ehrenfest
on 9 January 1916, Lorentz resorted to similar reasoning: in
the case of a ‘matter-free’ field, he pointed out, if one introduces
by virtue of a coordinate transformation a new solution of
the field equations (A) ‘‘symbolically expressed’’ as g0mn ¼ F 0ðx0aÞ,
[t]hen gmn ¼ F 0ðxaÞ will also satisfy equations (A)’’ (Lorentz
to Ehrenfest, 9 Jan. 1916; cited and translated in Kox, 1987).
On 10 January 1916, the day after having sent this remark to
Ehrenfest, Lorentz received a letter from him. Attached he found
Einstein’s 9 January 1916 epistolary response to objections
Ehrenfest had made in a (lost) letter of 5 January 1916. Einstein
famously resorted to a diagram representing the geodesic path of
a light ray coming from a distant star that passes through an
aperture directing it at a right angle onto a photographic plate.
3 The German word reproduces the etymological structure of the Latin word:
cum¼mit; incidere¼fallen: ‘‘fall together’’. According to Howard & Norton (1993),
however, Koinzidenz is more suggestive of the ‘‘notion of the intersections of lines
at extensionless points," whereas Zusammenfallen is ‘‘more suggestive of macro-
scopic congruences’’ of measuring instruments (Howard & Norton, 1993, 54).
4 ‘‘The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources’’, is often
quoted but probably apocryph statement included in many collections of Einstein
quotations.
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Then he suggested to Ehrenfest that he copy the diagram onto
tracing paper, bend it without stretching it, and then make a
carbon copy back onto the writing paper.
‘‘When you relate the figure once again to orthogonal writing
paper coordinates’’, Einstein explained to Ehrenfest, the trans-
formed situation is ‘‘mathematically a different one from before,
of course also in relations to the gmn’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 180, p. 238;
my emphasis); however ‘‘physically it is exactly the same since the
writing paper coordinate system is only something imaginary
[eingebildetes]’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 180, 239; my emphasis); it has no
reality independent from the gmn. It is physically irrelevant at
which point on the writing paper the world-line of the light ray
intersects the world-line of the pinhole; the point being referred
to is, in all coordinate system, where the light ray intersects the
pin-hole: ‘‘It all depends on coincidences’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 180, 239),
Einstein restated to Ehrenfest; the coordinates of such coinci-
dences have no physical meaning.
Einstein’s ‘‘Kretschmannian’’ coincidence parlance achieved
the hoped-for result. Lorentz read Einstein’s letter to Ehrenfest
and was immediately convinced: ‘‘I had read only a part of it’’,
he wrote on 10/11 January 1916, ‘‘and I saw that he was entirely
right. I wrote to him straight away to retract my objections of
yesterday’’ (cited and translated in Kox, 1987, 73). Einstein wrote
to Ehrenfest on 17 January expressing his joy for the extraordin-
ary receptivity of the Leyden community of physicists: ‘‘a little
corner of heaven on this dreary planet’’ [Prachtswinkel auf diesem
o¨den Planeten], as he famously described it. On the same day
Einstein could write to Lorentz: ‘‘I am y very happy that you
agree with me; in particular I see that you have thought over the
theory entirely and have familiarized yourself with the idea that
all of our experiences in physics refer to coincidences’’ (CPAE 8, Doc.
245). In the same letter Einstein completely agrees with Lorentz’s
formulation of the general covariance and suggested that Lorentz
make his considerations available to ‘‘other physicists, too, by
writing a treatise on the foundations of the theory’’ (CPAE 8, Doc.
183, 245; cf. Illy, 1989).
4.2. The ‘‘Public’’ point-coincidence argument
As early as 26 February 1916—at the meeting of the Dutch
Academy of Science—Lorentz presented a coordinate-free treat-
ment of general relativity, which he described precisely in terms
of point-coincidences. He explicitly referred to a ‘‘striking remark’’
(Lorentz, 1917, 1342) of Einstein—‘‘[in] a correspondence I had
with him’’ (Lorentz, 1917, 1342, footnote 3)—‘‘that the coinci-
dences only are of importance’’ (Lorentz, 1917, 1343), whereas
the ‘‘coordinates will be of secondary importance’’ (Lorentz, 1917,
1344). Lorentz appears to have been the very first to refer publicly
to the point-coincidence argument (cf. Illy, 1989; Janssen, 1992,
for more details).
The most famous ‘‘public version’’ of the argument appeared of
course in Einstein’s review article on general relativity received
by the Annalen der Physk on March 1916 (Einstein, 1916). Einstein,
after having motivated the need to generalize the restricted
principle of relativity, famously suggests, as an independent
argument for general covariance, that all physical experience
can be reduced to ‘‘nothing but verifications of such meetings of
the material points of our measuring instruments with other
material points’’. Since ‘‘all our physical experience can be
ultimately reduced to such coincidences’’, then ‘‘there is no
immediate reason for preferring certain systems of co-ordinates
to others’’, because all coordinate systems agree in point-
coincidences (Einstein, 1916, 776).
Without any further details, Einstein’s argument dangerously
resembles Kretschmann’s original version. Einstein seems to
defend an impoverished image of physical reality where only
point coincidences are physically relevant, since only point-
coincidences are preserved by the general group of smooth
coordinate transformations; everything else is apparently deemed
to be physically insignificant. Space and time are deprived of ‘‘the
last remnant of physical objectivity’’, as Einstein famously put it
(Einstein 1916, 776). This reading of the argument—although
perhaps in consonance with Einstein’s ‘‘subtractive strategy’’
(Norton, 1999)—is undoubtedly misleading.
To find a less ambiguous ‘‘public’’ formulation of the point-
coincidence argument, one has to turn again to the Leyden
community of physicists, where the issue must have provoked a
lively discussion. In July 1916, in his detailed review of Einstein’s
general theory (the first one that appeared in English in October
1916), Willem De Sitter—who would become famous for his
fundamental contributions to general relativistic cosmology—
formulated the point-coincidence argument in a way that makes
the issues at stake much more clear:
They [the field equations Gik ¼ kTik], therefore, are not suffi-
cient to determine the gik. This is essential. For the gij determine
the character of the four-dimensional system of reference, and
the principle of general relativity requires that this system can
be arbitrarily chosen. They must, therefore, not imply a choice
of the system of co-ordinates, i.e. they must leave the gij to a
certain extent undetermined. In order to determine the gij
completely we must add to the equations [Gik ¼ kTik] four
additional conditions, which can be arbitrarily chosen, and
which determine the choice of the system of reference.
According to the form of these additional conditions the gik
will be different functions of the co-ordinates, the equations of
motion will be different, the course of rays of light will be
different, but there will always be the same intersections of
world-lines, and consequently all observable phenomena will be
exactly the same: they will only be described by a different
system of space co-ordinates and a different time. One system
may be more convenient than another—this is a matter of
taste; but we cannot say that one system is true and another
false (de Sitter, 1916b, 418f.; my emphasis).
De Sitter’s formulation leaves no room for misunderstanding. He
makes clear the obvious fact that, in general relativity, the smooth
‘‘deformation’’ of the coordinate system must be accompanied by
the change of the gik, so that the two situations agree not only in
point-coincidences, but also in the lengths of world-lines and the
angles of intersections among them. The claim that ‘‘what we
observe are always intersections of world-lines’’, should be read in
the sense that we observe only that the world-lines meet, not
where they meet: ‘‘About the course of world-lines between the
points of intersection we know nothing, and no observation can
ever tell us anything’’ (de Sitter, 1916a, 700).
Referring to Hilbert’s ‘‘first communication’’ on the ‘‘founda-
tion of physics’’ (Hilbert, 1915), in August 1916 De Sitter empha-
sized that ‘‘an essential feature of the new theory is that of the ten
equations ðGik ¼ kTikÞ, only six are mutually independent. The gmn
are therefore not determined by these equations: there remains a
large amount of freedom unless four additional equations are
imposed. It was precisely the ‘‘large amount of freedom’’ (de
Sitter, 1916a, 708) mentioned by De Sitter that Einstein initially
thought conflicted with the theory’s predictability. The problem
arises because in general relativity the physical system being
dealt with is described bymore variables than there are physically
independent degrees of freedom.
In his ‘‘second communication’’ (presented on December 1915
and February 1916 published as Hilbert, 1917), Hilbert famously
presented this issue in terms of the Cauchy problem for the
field equations: given the initial data, Einstein’s equations leave
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undetermined the future evolution of 4 out of the 10 values of the
gmn (Stachel, 1988). Hilbert showed that this is not in conflict with
the law of causality by resorting—as his Go¨ttingen colleague Paul
Hertz did in August 1915—to the language of Gauss’ theory of
surfances (on Hilbert and Hertz see Corry, 2003, 326).
Just like in the ‘‘theory of curves and surfaces’’, ‘‘so also in
physics we must characterize a statement that does not remain
invariant under any arbitrary transformation of the coordinate
system as physically meaningless’’ (Hilbert, 1917, 61). For
instance—as Hilbert pointed out in his November 1916 ‘‘causality
lecture’’—in geography the assertion ‘‘that three places have the
same geographical latitude is meaningless; in fact this claim is
destroyed by a coordinate transformation’’ (Hilbert, 1916/1917, 8).
On the contrary, the claim that ‘‘three places lie on a great circle
of the earth is independent of the choice of reference system’’
(Hilbert, 1916/1917, 8; on the relation to the ‘‘hole argument’’, see
Renn & Stachel, 2007; for a different interpretation see Brading &
Ryckman, 2008, Section 7). Intersecting great circles intersect in
every projection of the earth on a flat sheet of paper; the fact that,
in different projections, they appear to intersect at different
points of the paper is, needless to say, irrelevant to the carto-
grapher. The point being referred to can be identified in all
projections, as can the point where the two great circles meet:
‘‘any individual assertion regarding an occurrence [Begebenheit]
or an encounter [Zusammentreffen] of occurrences has a mean-
ing, if is independent of designation [Benennung], if it is invar-
iant’’ (Hilbert, 1916/1917, 5).
5. Between Kretschmann and Einstein: Schlick’s
point-coincidence argument
Thus, Einstein’s formulation of the point-coincidence argu-
ment in his 1916 review article was utterly elliptical. The
ambiguity resides precisely in the claim that only point-
coincidences have physical reality, that is only the fact that two
or more world-lines have ‘‘a particular system of co-ordinate
values, x1,x2,x3,x4 in common’’ (Einstein, 1917, 64). As we have
tried to show, Einstein borrowed Kretschmann’s expression in
order to explain to his correspondents that the particular coordi-
nate values of such common points are not relevant to physics.
However, it is understandable that Einstein’s statement could be
instinctively read as Kretschmann had originally formulated it in
1915. If only point-coincidences are relevant, then all remaining
properties of space–time that are not reducible to point-
coincidences cannot find expression in the fundamental mathe-
matical structure of the theory and thus are arbitrary and
conventional.
5.1. Schlick’s 1917 paper on general relativity
This was precisely the conclusion reached by Moritz Schlick in
his celebrated Raum und Zeit in der gegenwa¨rtigen Physik, pub-
lished in two installments on 17 March and 23 March 1917 in the
semi-popular journal Die Naturwissenschaften (Schlick, 1917a, tr.
in Schlick, 1978, vol. I, 207–269). As is well known, Schlick was
trained as a physicist, and on 20 May 1904—exactly 10 years
before Kretschmann—he had also completed his doctorate in
physics under the direction of Max Planck (Schlick, 1904).
Schlick claims to follow Poincare´’s lead by declaring that if
‘‘the objects in the universe are arbitrarily distorted in arbitrary
directions’’, as long as we suppose that ‘‘all measuring instru-
ments, including our own bodies’’ share the same deformation,
‘‘the whole transformation immediately becomes unascertain-
able’’ (Schlick, 1917a, 164, tr. 1978, I, 227). Schlick justifies this
claim by resorting to the idea that only coincidences are ascer-
tainable by those measuring instruments:
The adjustment and reading of all measuring instrumentsy is
always accomplished by observing the space–time-coinci-
dence of two or more points . . . Such coincidences are there-
fore, strictly speaking, alone capable of being observed; and the
whole of physics may be regarded as a quintessence of laws,
according to which the occurrence of these space–time-
coincidences takes place. Everything else in our world-picture
which can not be reduced to such coincidences is devoid of
physical objectivity, and may just as well be replaced by
something else. All world pictures which lead to the same
laws for these point-coincidences are, from the point of view
of physics, in every way equivalent. We saw earlier that it
signifies no observable, physically real, change at all, if we
imagine the whole world deformed in any arbitrary manner,
provided that after the deformation the co-ordinates of every
physical point are continuous, single-valued, but otherwise
quite arbitrary, functions of its co-ordinates before the defor-
mation. Now, such a point-transformation actually leaves all
spatial coincidences totally unaffected; they are not changed by
the distortion, however much all distances and positions may be
altered by them. For, if two points A and B, which coincide
before the deformation (i.e. are infinitely near one another),
are at a point the coordinates of which are x1,x2x3, and if A
arrives at the point x01 x
0
2 x
0
3 as a result of the deformation,
then, since by hypothesis the x1 x2 x3 are continuous single-
valued functions of the x1 x2 x3’s, B must also have the co-
ordinates x01 x
0
2 x
0
3 , after the deformation, i.e. must be at the
same point (or infinitely near) A. Consequently, all coincidences
remain undisturbed by the deformation (Schlick, 1917a, 181, tr.
1978, I, 241, my emphasis).
Schlick could plausibly have read the point-coincidence argu-
ment as the claim that, since all worlds that agree on such
coincidences are equivalent, a choice among them is the result
of an arbitrary stipulation. Space assumes a determinate metrical
structure only after a decision has been made about the behavior
of our measuring instrument. ‘‘Poincare´ has expressed this tersely
in the words: ‘Space itself is amorphous; only the things in it give
it a form’’ (Schlick, 1917a, 166, tr. 1978, I, 239, see Section 3).
Poincare´ invited us to declare the bodies to be ‘‘rigid’’ that, when
used as measuring rods, lead to the simplest geometry. Schlick
argues instead that we should choose ‘‘the simplest formulae to
express the laws of physics’’ as a criterion (Schlick, 1917a, 186, tr.
1978, I, 238; my emphasis).
Moving from the consideration of space to that of space–time,
it was easy for Schlick to use this sort of argument in the context
of general relativity: ‘‘Whereas a point transformation in space
alone represented . . . a change of position and a distortion of
bodies, a point-transformation in the four-dimensional universe
also signifies a change in the state of motion of the three-
dimensional world of bodies: since the time co-ordinate is also
affected by the transformation’’ (Schlick, 1917a, 182, tr. 1978, I,
242; my emphasis). The ‘‘relativity of all motions’’ allegedly
proclaimed by general relativity is thus regarded as the conse-
quence of our freedom of deforming space–time as we please; it is
simply the four-dimensional counterpart of what Schlick labels
‘‘the geometrical relativity of space’’:
Our considerations about the general relativity of space may
immediately be extended to the four-dimensional space–time
manifold y The system of world-lines in this x1-x2-x3-x4-
manifold represents the happening in time of all events in the
worldy If we suppose a complete change of this sort to take
place, by which every physical point is transferred to another
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space–time point in such a way that its new co-ordinates,
x1,x2,x3,x4, are quite arbitrary (but continuous and single-
valued) functions of its previous co-ordinates x1,x2,x3,x4: then
the new world is, as in previous cases, not in the slightest
degree different from the old one physically, and the whole
change is only a transformation to other co-ordinates. For that
which we can alone observe by means of our instruments, viz.
space–time-coincidences, remains unaltered. Hence points
which coincided at the world-point x1,x2,x3,x4 in the one
universe would again coincide in the other at the world-
point x01,x
0
2,x
0
3,x
0
4. Their coincidence—and this is all that we can
observe— takes place in the second world precisely as in the first
(Schlick, 1917a, 182, tr. 1978, I, 242, my emphasis).
The point-coincidence argument allows Schlick to exorcise the
novelty of Einstein’s newborn theory by simply inserting it into
the context of what was then an already familiar 19th century
debate about geometry. In Schlick’s reading, the meaning of the
requirement that the laws of physics ‘‘are ‘covariant’ for all
substitutions’’ must be found in the fact that ‘‘it allows the
relativity of space, in the most general sense discussed’’ (Schlick,
1917a, 182, tr. 1978, 1, 238). This is the great achievement of
Einstein’s theory. Space and time do not have any metric struc-
ture given a priori, as Kantians had uncritically assumed; such a
structure is introduced only by an arbitrary convention. ‘‘In this
way,’’ according to Schlick, ‘‘Space and Time are deprived of the
last vestige of physical objectivity, to use Einstein’s words’’
(Schlick, 1917a, 182, tr. 1978, I, 238, my emphasis).
If one considers the more technical parts of Schlick’s paper,
it is puzzling how he could find this conclusion philosophically
satisfying. Of course, general covariance assures that one is free to
introduce any coordination of the physical space that is produced
by an arbitrary, if smooth, transformation from the original.
However, this transformation must be accompanied by a suitable
change of the gmn, so that the ds
2 remains unchanged; all measure
relations can be ‘‘recovered’’ in the new coordinate system by
using the new g0mn to get real distances from coordinate distances.
Thus the coordinate transformation is taken into account in
general relativity precisely insofar as it does not change the
underlying metrical properties. The world, as Hertz had put it,
‘‘must be developable onto itself’’, like the bending without
stretching of an inelastic piece of paper (see also Born, 1916,
56), and not freely deformable like a rubber sheet.
This becomes even more evident if one considers that in
general relativity—as Schlick correctly notices—‘‘the definition
of a geodetic line is independent of the co-ordinate system’’: ‘‘the
shortest connecting line between two world-points, likewise
represents a shortest line in the new system of x01,x
0
2,x
0
3,x
0
4’’
(Schlick, 1917a, 184, tr. 1978, I, 247). For this simple reason the
‘‘relativity of all motions’’—which was certainly a part of Ein-
stein’s heuristic—was not achieved in the final theory. Motion
along a geodesic path or deflection from a geodesic path are
absolutely different in general relativity, as in previous theories,
and no coordinate transformation can eliminate this difference:
‘‘the Einstein Law,’’ Schlick continues, ‘‘which comprises both
inertial and gravitational effects, asserts the world-line of a
material point is a geodetic line in the space–time continuum.
This law fulfills the condition of relativity for it is an invariant for
any arbitrary transformations, since the geodetic line is defined
independently of the system of reference’’ (Schlick, 1917a, 184, tr.
1978, I, 247, my emphasis). What is ‘‘conventional’’ in Einstein’s
new theory—a point that Hermann Weyl was probably the
first to make completely clear during the 1920 Bad-Nauheim
debate (Weyl, 1920)—is the distinction of ‘‘inertial and gravita-
tional effects’’ and certainly not the inertio-gravitational structure
itself.
5.2. The appendix to the book edition of Schlick’s 1917 paper
As is well known, Einstein was enthusiastic about Schlick’s
paper (CPAE 8, 297, 389, letter to Schlick of 6 February 1917; cf.
Howard, 1984; Hentschel, 1986), which he read very carefully. He
famously corrected Schlick’s ‘‘infinitesimally flat’’ interpretation
of the equivalence principle (CPAE 8, 314, 417f.; letter to Schlick
of 21 March 1917; cf. Norton, 1985). However, no other remarks
are made about Schlick’s conventionalist reading of the point-
coincidence argument. Einstein might still have found philoso-
phically appealing that general relativity had transformed the
rigid ‘‘body of reference’’ of special relativity into a ‘‘mollusk of
reference’’, as he had put it in his late 1916 ‘‘gemeinversta¨n-
dliches’’ book on relativity (published as Einstein, 1917).
However, it is evident that Schlick’s reading led him to draw
philosophical consequences from the point-coincidence argument
that do not seem to have much to do with the requirement of
general covariance. In the paragraph ‘‘Relation to philosophy’’—-
which Schlick added to the book version of his paper (finished in
May 1917)—Schlick laid down what he later labeled the
‘‘method of coincidences’’, in which Einstein’s argument is inter-
preted as a bridge between physiological space to the abstract
mathematical one:
For it is here that experiences arising out of coincidences come
into account. In order to fix a point in space, we must in some
way or other, directly or indirectly, point to it: we must make
the point of a pair of compasses, or a finger, or the intersection
of cross-wires, coincide with it (i.e. bring about a time-space
coincidence of two elements which are usually apart). Now
these coincidences always occur consistently for all the intui-
tional spaces of the various senses and for various individuals.
It is just on account of this that a ‘point’ is defined which is
objective, i.e. independent of individual experiences and valid
for all y Upon close investigation, we find that we arrive at
the construction of physical space and time by just this
method of coincidences and by no other process. The space–
time manifold is neither more nor less than the quintessence
of objective elements as defined by this method. The fact of its
being a four-dimensional manifold follows from experience in
the application of the method itself. This is the outcome of our
analysis of the conceptions of space and time y We see that
we encounter just that significance of space and time which
Einstein has recognized to be essential and unique for physics,
where he has established it in its full right (Schlick, 1917b, 58,
tr. 1978, 1, 263).
Schlick again reads Einstein’s argument as the claim that
coincidences alone are relevant and empirically determinable,
and thus the only basis for the construction of the physical space.
This interpretation must have sounded natural to the philosophi-
cally informed reader. In a 1917 paper, Philip Frank—the succes-
sor to Einstein’s Prague chair in physics, who would become one
of the most important associates of the Vienna Circle—argued
that ‘‘Einstein joined Mach’’ by claiming that ‘‘space and time
properly speaking no longer occurred, but only the coincidence
[Koinzidenz] of phenomena’’ (Frank, 1917, 70, tr. 1950, 73; my
emphasis). Mach’s name was probably the first to come to mind
by interpreting Einstein’s appeal to point-coincidences as the only
content of a physical theory. Neither could Schlick avoid evoking
the Machian flavor of Einstein’s remark, even if he rejected the
psychologistic reading of the notion of coincidence usually
associated with Mach’s positivism:
Physics introduces, as its ultimate indefinable conception, the
coincidence [Zusammenfallen] of two events; on the other
hand, the psycho-genetic analysis of the idea of objective space
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ends in the conception of the space–time coincidence [Koinzi-
denz] of two elements of perception. Are they to be regarded
simply as one and the same thing? Rigorous positivism, such
as that of Mach, affirms them to be soy According to him, the
directly experienced elements such as colours, tones, pres-
sures, warmths, etc., are the sole reality y This view is,
however, not the only possible interpretation of scientific facts
y [T]he quantities which occur in physical laws do not all
indicate ‘elements’ in Mach’s sense. The coincidences which
are expressed by the differential equations of physics are not
immediately accessible to experience. They do not directly
signify a coincidence of sense-data y We might just as well
assume that elements or qualities which cannot be directly
experienced also exist. These can likewise be termed ‘real’
whether they be comparable with intuitional ones or not
(Schlick, 1917b, 58f. tr. 1978, I, 264f.).
Against Mach’s positivism, Schlick insists that it is essential to
physics to translate the elementary Erlebnisse about coincidences
into the abstract framework of a ‘‘number manifold’’ where these
relations can be expressed in terms of identity or the neighboring
of coordinates values: ‘‘We cannot therefore ascribe to physical
objects the space of intuition with which our visual perceptions
have made us acquainted, nor that which we find present in our
tactual presentations, but only a conceptual arrangement, which we
then term objective space, and determine by means of a suitably
disposed manifold of numbers (co-ordinates)’’ (Schlick, 1917b, tr.
1978, I, 238, my emphasis). Space–time ‘‘in mathematical lan-
guage’’ is simply ‘‘the manifold of all number quadruples
x1,x2,x3,x4’’ (Schlick, 1917b, 58f, tr. 1978, I, 238.). The method of
coincidences led us from the physiological space–time as the
totality of all possible experience of coincidences to the abstract
concept of space–time as the totality of possible quadruples of
real numbers.
Schlick was of course proudly convinced that he was exploit-
ing the philosophical implications of Einstein’s ‘‘public version’’ of
the point-coincidence argument. However, the examples of
Schlick’s prose we have quoted at length should allow us to see
the emperor’s new clothes: what Schlick was actually doing was
unwittingly rehearsing, without significant changes, Kretsch-
mann’s version of the argument as it appears in his 1915 paper.
If the emperor was not completely naked, his clothes were surely
not new.
Schlick refers to the same authors, Poincare´ and Mach, and
reaches the very same conclusions as Kretschmann: the mea-
sure-relations of space are undetermined by experience, which
only has access to the set of all possible point-coincidences,
which, in turn, is encoded in the structure of the number-
manifold, that is, the set of all possible quadruples of real
numbers. Everything else is the result of a stipulation—a stipula-
tion about the behavior of our measuring instruments, clocks and
measuring-rods. The only reason to prefer one stipulation over
another is due to a criterion of simplicity. The only missing
element in Schlick’s presentation are Kretschmann’s group-
theoretical considerations about the relations between invariance
and relativity principles. Ironically, as we shall see in the next
section, this is exactly the point of view from which Schlick’s
misunderstanding most clearly emerges (Friedman, 1983, 25ff.;
Friedman, 1984, 654).
Of course, there is no evidence that Schlick ever read
Kretschmann’s paper, and there is no reason to conjecture that
he did. Schlick’s ‘‘Kretschmannian’’ reading was, so to speak, an
instinctive one. It must have seemed natural at the time to
interpret Einstein’s point-coincidence remark alongside ‘‘the ideas
of such men as Mach and Poincare´’’ (Frank, 1950, 11). After all,
this is precisely where the argument comes from, and Schlick was
of course acquainted with this tradition before even coming into
contact with general relativity (Engler, 2006).
However, when Einstein ‘‘stole’’ Kretschmann’s point-
coincidence remark in late 1915, he immediately inserted it into
a completely different tradition—one that culminated in the work
of Ricci and Levi-Civita, and in which general relativity famously
represented a ‘‘triumph’’. Considering the argument from
this perspective—as Kretschmann himself rapidly came to
realize—meant subjecting it to a sort of Kuhnian ‘‘Gestalt-switch’’.
In contrast to Kretschmann, however, the logical empiricists were
unable to achieve the same change of perspective. They continued
to see the duck instead of the rabbit, or, leaving metaphors aside,
to see Mach and Poincare´ where Ricci and Levi-Civita were
meant to be.
6. Kretschmann after Einstein: the triviality of the ‘‘public’’
point-coincidence argument
Just as Einstein was enthusiastic about Schlick’s 1917 paper, he
was also pleased with his booklet as well. In a letter to Schlick on
21 May 1917, Einstein described the ‘‘last section, ‘Relations to
Philosophy’ as excellent [vortrefflich]’’ (CPAE 8, Doc. 343, 456).
Employing the parable of two different people pursuing physics
interdependently, he suggested to Schlick that he should further
clarify the notion of what is real in physics: not ‘‘the immediately
given’’, but exclusively the ‘‘spatiotemporally arranged’’ (CPAE 8,
Doc. 343, 456). The philosophical relevance of these remarks has
often been discussed in the historical and philosophical literature
(Howard, 1984, Section 1; Howard, 1999, Section 4). It is, how-
ever, rather puzzling that Einstein did not point out to Schlick that
his reading of the point-coincidence argument was based on a
fundamental misunderstanding.
Just like the early Kretschmann, Schlick claimed that the
choice between different space–time geometries endowed
with different metrical properties—sets of gmn that cannot be
transformed into one another by a simple coordinate
transformation—is arbitrary, whereas the ‘‘topological’’ relations
represented by point-coincidences are univocally determined by
experience. This, however, had nothing to do with Einstein’s
version of the argument, not even with the ‘‘public’’ version. As,
for instance, De Sitter’s formulation clearly shows (see Section
4.2), Einstein referred to the possibility of representing the same
space–time geometry in different coordinate systems by using
different sets of gmn that differ only by a coordinate transforma-
tion. The context in which the argument should be read is not, of
course, that of Poincare´’s conventionalism colored with a
‘‘Machian’’ flavor, but rather Ricci and Levi-Civita’s ‘‘absolute
differential calculus’’.
This is what Kretschmann himself had rapidly come to realize.
On 14 August 1917, only several months after the appearance of
the first edition of Schlick’s booklet, the Annalen der Physik
received the manuscript of a second paper of Kretschmann’s,
which was dated 6 August: U¨ber den physikalischen Sinn der
Relativita¨tspostulatem A. Einsteins neue und seine urspru¨ngliche
Relativita¨tstheorie (Kretschmann, 1918). The paper—‘‘rediscov-
ered’’ by James L. Anderson in the mid-1960s (Anderson, 1964
184; Anderson, 1967, Section 10.3)—was destined to become a
classic and has therefore been widely discussed in the historical
and philosophical literature (Norton, 1995, 2003; Pitts, 2008;
Rynasiewicz, 1999). However, less importance has been given to
a comparison between Kretschmann’s first and second papers, an
issue which will be insisted on here.
As is well known, Kretschmann, after having recalled Einstein’s
alleged connection between the covariance requirement and
M. Giovanelli / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (2013) 115–134 125
Author's personal copy
relativity principle, famously turned the ‘‘public version’’ of the
point-coincidence argument against Einstein himself:
The forms in which different authors have expressed the
postulate of the Lorentz–Einstein theory of relativity—and
especially the forms in which Einstein has recently expressed
his postulate of general relativity—admit the following inter-
pretation (in the case of Einstein, it is required explicitly):
A system of physical laws satisfies a relativity postulate if the
equations by means of which it is represented are covariant
with respect to the group of spatiotemporal coordinate trans-
formations associated with that postulate. If one accepts this
interpretation and recalls that, in the final analysis, all physical
observations consist in the determination of purely topological
relations ([‘‘coincidences’’]1) between objects of spatiotemporal
perception, from which it follows that no coordinate system is
privileged2 by these observations, then one is forced to the
following conclusion: By means of a purely mathematical
reformulation of the equations3 representing the theory, and
with, at most, mathematical complications connected with
that reformulation, any physical theory can be brought into
agreement with any arbitrary relativity postulate, even the
most general one, and this without modifying any of its content
that can be tested by observation (Kretschmann, 1918, 576f.; my
emphasis; partially translated in, Norton, 1995, 228).
In the footnote (1) Kretschmann refers us to Einstein’s 1916
review paper for the choice of ‘‘Koinzidenz’’, instead of his own
‘‘Zusammenfallen’’. Aside from this minor point, Kretschmann
clearly recognized his own argument in Einstein’s wording. He
cites his own 1915 paper in the footnote (2) and thus directs
‘‘readers to Einstein’s unacknowledged source for his point coin-
cidence argument’’ (see Norton, 1991). However, Kretschmann
actually does not claim any priority. He must also have sensed
that Einstein had cast his own argument in a very different
conceptual framework. In particular, in note (3) Kretschmann
adds a reference to Ricci and Levi-Civita’s work (Levi-Civita &
Ricci-Curbastro, 1900), who were not even mentioned in his
first paper.
As is well known, Kretschmann’s ‘‘triviality charge’’ against
Einstein’s requirement of general covariance is based on the idea
that special relativity (and any other space–time theory) can also
be reformulated in a generally covariant way without changing its
physical content. ‘‘Einstein,’’ Kretschmann points out, based his
requirement of general covariance on the fact that all ‘‘physical
experience ultimately consists in the observation of purely topological
relations or ‘‘coincidences’’ between spatiotemporal objects of obser-
vation’’ (Kretschmann, 1918, 577; my emphasis). Consequently,
‘‘in experience no reason can be found to privilege any refe-
rence system for space and time above all others as the sole
legitimate ones’’ (Kretschmann, 1918). However, Kretschmann
points out, this is not a specific feature of general relativity
(Kretschmann, 1918).
Kretschmann (1918, 579) invites the reader to consider the
system of reference Sðx1 ¼ x, x2 ¼ x, x3 ¼ z; x4 ¼ ictÞ where the
equations of the light propagation assume the well-known form:
x1x01þ    þx4x04 ¼ 0 ð1Þ
According to Kretschmann we can easily reformulate this
equation in a ‘‘generally covariant’’ way, valid for all coordinate
systems, by using a quadratic differential form with variable
coefficients. In Kretschmann’s own notation:
d
R
ds¼ 0
ds2 ¼ P gmn dxm dxn ¼ 0
ðln,mt¼ 0Þ, l,n,m,t¼ 1,2,3,4
8><
>:
ð2Þ
where ðln,mtÞ represent the components of the ‘‘Einstein’s curva-
ture tensor of the space–time manifold’’ (Kretschmann, 1918,
579) in the old-fashioned notation (Kretschmann refers us to
Christoffel, 1869).
Let us cover the Minkowski space–time with a rectangular grid
of coordinates; then of course gmn ¼ 1;1;1;21 for ðm¼ nÞ and
gmn ¼ 0 for ðmanÞ. If we perform a smooth substitution of the
independent variables xn, according to the well-known formula of
the absolute differential calculus, in place of the original gmnðxnÞ
we get a new non-standard system g0mnðx0nÞ under the condition
that ds2 remains invariant. For instance, one can introduce polar
coordinates (Kretschmann, 1918, 578); geodesics become curved
lines or, more precisely, since the coordinates are curved, geo-
desic lines are not simple linear functions of the coordinates.
However, this is merely a mathematical difference. The Riemann–
Christoffel–Tensor ðln,mtÞ necessarily vanishes in both cases.
Thus it is always possible to find a coordinate system in which
the gmn assume their standard Minkowski values. The difference of
the values of gmn is only an artifact introduced by the mathema-
tical formalism and does not imply any ‘‘real’’ physical difference.
Kretschmann could then show that it is very easy to provide a
generally covariant formulation of special relativity without
making the theory more ‘‘relativistic’’. One can still recognize
the Lorentz group as the one that is more adherent to the physical
content of the theory; it is the only group that would preserve the
equation (1) intact, whereas the passage from cartesian to polar
coordinates does not. The requirement of general covariance
therefore has nothing to do with an extension of the relativity
principle:
According to the general version of a relativity postulate we
have provided above, the same laws for light-propagation,
depending on the form of their presentation, satisfies—once
represented by (2)—the most general relativity postulate, and
in the other form, (1) only a special relativity postulate. The
same would apply to all physical laws. In fact according to the
investigations of Ricci and Levi-Civita [sic] it may scarcely be
doubted that one can bring any physical system of equations
into a generally covariant form without alteration of its
observationally testable content. This is obvious from the
beginning, if one once again recalls that strictly only purely
topological facts of natural phenomena or, according to Einstein,
coincidences are observable (Kretschmann, 1918, 579, my
emphasis).
Although the reference to the ‘‘topological facts’’ in which all
coordinate systems agree recalls Kretschmann’s wording in his
1915 paper, the problem Kretschmann is dealing with has
become completely different. As we have seen, in 1915 Kretsch-
mann, inspired by Mach and Poincare´, was concerned by the fact
that the choice between different relativity theories, characterized
for instance by different laws for the propagation of light—e.g.
Galilei-Hertz vs. Lorentz–Einstein—is only conventional. In 1917
Kretschmann, relying on Ricci and Levi-Civita’s investigations,
wanted to show that the very same Lorentz–Einstein theory can
be presented in arbitrary coordinate systems without changing its
physical content: ‘‘the light-propagation equation of the original
theory of relativity could be put into generally covariant form’’ by
merely introducing ‘‘the undetermined coefficients gmn into the
expression for the line element’’ (Kretschmann, 1918, 585f).
The very possibility of formulating special relativity in a
generally covariant form, according to Kretschmann, shows the
difference between the principle of relativity as a physical principle
and the covariance of the equations as a mathematical require-
ment. Roughly, Kretschmann identifies the relativity principle
with the existence of a 10-parameter continuous group of
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transformations, which leaves unchanged the expression for the
four-dimensional distance between two points ds2. In a flat
Minkowski space–time, the Lorentz-transformations leave
unchanged the values gmn ¼ 1,1,1,1 ðm¼ nÞ and gmn ¼ 0 ðmanÞ,
which thus remain the same functions of the coordinates. Geome-
trically (Sections 23–25) this means that such transformations
‘‘map back onto themselves [in sich selbst u¨berfu¨hren]’’
(Kretschmann, 1918, 583) all geodesic paths of light rays
d
R
ds2 ¼ 0 and free-falling particles r0—i.e. all possible
inertial paths.
On the contrary, in a non-uniform, general-relativistic space–
time there are, in the general case, no transformations that leave
the gmn unchanged; in general they are different functions of the
coordinates. Kretschmann showed that if two sets of gmn deter-
mine not only the same light rays’ trajectories, but also the same
path of free-falling particles, then those metrics differ at most by
a position-independent constant l.5 However, this degree of
freedom can also be eliminated by cosmological considerations:
the ‘‘curvature character of the world’’ [Kru¨mmungscharakter der
Welt]’’ (Kretschmann, 1918, 591, n. 2) forced us to assume a value
of l, so that the curvature radius is 1.
No trace of conventionalism seems to have survived in
Kretschmann’s epistemology. On the contrary, he now empha-
sizes that general relativistic space–time has a well-defined,
although variable metrical structure. In particular (Sections 17–21),
Kretschmann was able to prove that, in matter- and field-free
regions of space–time—where the Einstein tensor Bmn 
P
mn
ðln,
mtÞglt ¼ 0 —there might still be a set of four non-vanishing
components of the Riemann–Christoffel tensor ðln,mtÞ—the only
nontrivial scalars that can be constructed purely from the Rie-
mann tensor—which, in the general case, are different from point
to point.6 In the vast majority of space–times that satisfy the
gravitational field equations, there is no transformation that maps
such scalars back onto themselves besides identity.
The conclusion that Kretschmann drew from these considera-
tions has become famous: ‘‘Einstein’s theory satisfies no relativity
principle at all y it is a completely absolute theory’’
(Kretschmann, 1918, 610). As Kretschmann showed in the final
paragraphs of the paper (Sections 27–29), in order to satisfy a
‘‘general relativity principle’’, a theory would have to admit that
world-lines can ‘‘be mapped back into themselves by an arbitrary
continuous deformation [Verzerrung]’’ (Kretschmann, 1918, 612).
This would, however, destroy the difference between geodesic
and non-geodesic paths, making a theory based on the ‘‘geodesic
hypothesis’’—small ‘freely-falling’ bodies move along geodesic
trajectories—completely senseless. Actually, as Kretschmann
proves, special relativity has the largest relativity group on
‘‘a space–time manifold with Minkowski normal form of the line
element’’ (Kretschmann, 1918, 610). In Minkowski space–time
there is no theory ‘‘more relativistic’’ than special relativity.
Ironically, if Kretschmann’s first 1915 version of the point-
coincidences argument had de facto anticipated all the essential
lines of Schlick’s interpretation of general relativity, Kretsch-
mann’s second 1917 formulation of the argument already defini-
tively refuted it. Adopting Kretschmann’s group-theoretical
point of view on the relativity principles, it is easy to see where
Schlick’s mistake is located. By following Einstein’s claim, with
some understandable ingenuity, that the general covariance of his
theory embodied an extension of the principle of relativity to
acceleration, Schlick believed that in general relativity the laws of
physics are ‘‘invariant’’ with respect to a largest group of trans-
formations, which preserve only the relations of coincidence and
neighborhood between world-points (Friedman, 1983, 25ff.). As
we now know, the exact opposite is true—the invariance group of
general relativity is, in general, the identity group.
7. Einstein after Kretschmann once again: countering
Kretschmann’s objection
At the time, the correct relation between covariance and
invariance was of course not so easy to grasp (Norton, 1995).
On 1. February 1918 Einstein could still write to Sommerfeld that
‘‘Schlick’s presentation is masterful [meisterhaft]’’ (CPAE Doc.
453, 627). On the very same day, the Heft of the Annalen der
Physik that contained Kretschmann’s paper was distributed. In a
letter from 17 February 1918 (CPAE 8, Doc. 465, 649f.), Gustav
Mie must have drawn Einstein’s attention to Kretschmann’s
objection. Mie—who was in correspondence with Kretschmann—
emphasized in particular that a theory satisfying a general
principle of relativity would have looked exactly like Kretsch-
mann described it in the last paragraphs of his paper. Einstein
famously replied to ‘‘the penetrating work of Kretschmann
[scharfssinige Arbeit von Kretschmann]’’ (Einstein, 1918, 241)
immediately thereafter in an article received by the Annalen der
Physik on 6 March 1918 (Einstein, 1918).
Einstein regarded ‘‘Hr. Kretschmann’s argument’’ as correct:
‘‘Since the totality of physical experience refers only to coinci-
dences,’’ he summarizes, ‘‘it must always be possible to represent
experiences concerning the lawful dependencies of these coin-
cidences by means of generally covariant equations.’’ (Einstein,
1918, 242; my emphasis). Einstein nevertheless emphasized that
the link between the principle of relativity, the requirement of
general covariance and the point-coincidence argument possesses
‘‘an important heuristic force’’, if combined with a principle of
simplicity (Einstein, 1918, 242). A generally covariant formulation
of pre-general-relativistic physics would be unnecessarily com-
plicated ‘‘from the standpoint of the absolute differential calculus’’
(Einstein, 1918, 242 cf. Bergmann, 1942, 159).
Einstein’s answer to Kretschmann’s objection—published on
24 May 1918—is not usually considered to be particularly
effective, but it reconfirms the ‘‘standpoint’’ from which the
argument should be understood. A more compelling counter-
objection may be found, at least indirectly, in the first edition of
Hermann Weyl’s Raum-Zeit-Materie (Weyl, 1918; the book was
prepared from the lecture notes of a course given in the summer
term of 1917 at ETH Zurich), the proofs of which Einstein had
started to read with ‘‘real enthusiasm’’ at the beginning of march
1918 (CPAE 8, Doc. 472 and Doc. 476).
Weyl—without mentioning Kretschmann—also emphasizes
that the requirement of general covariance is a ‘‘purely mathe-
matical affair [rein mathematische Angelegenheit]’’. By letting the
gik appear in the expression of the line element, ‘‘we may
formulate physical laws so that they remain invariant for arbi-
trary transformations; this is a possibility that is purely mathe-
matical in essence and denotes no particular peculiarity of these
laws’’ (Weyl, 1918, 181; tr. 1922, 226; slightly modified). However,
whereas in special relativity the gik can always be reduced to the
pre-assigned Malinowski-values, in general relativity the gik have
become ‘‘physical field quantities’’—just like ‘‘the components fi
of the electromagnetic potentials’’—‘‘to which there corresponds
something real’’: ‘‘This assumption, rather than the postulate of
general invariance, seems to the author to be the real pivot of the
general theory of relativity’’ (Weyl, 1918, 181; tr. 1922, 227).
5 This turned out to be a groundbreaking result that will be developed by
Weyl (1921) and Lorentz (1923) (cf. Ehlers, Pirani, & Schild, 1972 for a modern
treatment).
6 This is another major achievement of Kretschmann’s paper that will be later
rediscovered by Komar (1958); cf. Section 9.
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In the Encyclopedia article on relativity theory, which the
prodigiously young Wolfgang Pauli had completed in December
1920 (cf. Pauli, 1921, 175; the article was published on 15
November 1921), Weyl’s approach is explicitly used against
Kretschmann’s objection (Dieks, 2006, 186f.; cfr. Pauli, 1921,
711). There is, however, a profound difference between general
relativity and traditional field theories. In general relativity, ‘‘once
we have found any kind of solutions of the general covariant field
equations, we can derive from them an arbitrary number of other
solutions by means of a different choice of coordinates’’ (Pauli,
1921, 192; tr. 1958, 160). For this reason, as Pauli notices,
‘‘Einstein had, for a time, held the erroneous view that one could
deduce from the non-uniqueness of the solution that the gravita-
tional equations could not be generally covariant’’ (Pauli, 1921,
192; tr. 1958, 160). In footnote 315 Pauli gives credit to Hilbert for
having been the first to show that ‘‘the contradiction with the
causality principle is only apparent’’: ‘‘the many possible solu-
tions of the field equations aree only formally different. Physically
they are completely equivalent’’ (Pauli, 1921, 192; tr. 1958, 160; my
emphasis).
As De Sitter had clearly recognized (and in a published
writing; see Section 4), the claim that only coincidences, and not
their coordinates, are observable was precisely Einstein’s way of
dealing with such a surplus of mathematical structure that has no
correlate in physical reality. Thus Einstein’s remark does not serve
at all, as Schlick thought, to deprive every mathematical structure
that is not reducible to point-coincidences of physical signifi-
cance. In the 1920s Schlick was also in personal and epistolary
contact with Pauli (who at that time was a strict positivist, like his
godfather Mach; Meyenn, 2009, Section 5). Schlick, however, was
never able to appreciate the philosophical relevance of the
presence of such redundancy in the mathematical formalism of
general relativity: the same physical world can be described by
mathematically different solutions of the field equations.
8. Back to Kretschmann: the unacknowledged triumph
of Kretschmann’s conventionalist epistemology
8.1. Logical empiricists and Kretschmann’s early point-coincidence
argument
In his 1918 Allgemeine Erkenntislehre, Schlick further articu-
lated the epistemological consequences of his ‘‘method of coin-
cidences’’ (Schlick, 1918, 236) by introducing a form of ‘‘critical
realism’’—probably inspired by Riehl’s7 work (Heidelberger,
2007). ‘‘Coincidences’’—on which different senses of the same
and different individuals necessarily agree—give access to noth-
ing less than the things-in-themselves. This rather surprising
‘‘realistic’’ conclusion became the philosophical counterpart to
the conventionalist reading of general relativity that remained
unchanged in the successive editions of his 1917 booklet (Schlick,
1919, 1920). Schlick, needless to say, was convinced that he was
exploiting the philosophical implications of Einstein’s 1916 point-
coincidence argument. What he was actually doing—as we have
seen—was rehearsing Kretschmann’s version of the argument as
it appears in a minor article from 1915, in an irony of fate, before
general relativity as we know it even existed. The conventionalist
interpretation of general relativity was, so to speak, born dead.
Kretschmann’s second and more famous 1917/1918 paper should
have put Schlick on the right track. However, as we shall see, the
paper went unnoticed in the philosophical community.
As the young Reichenbach had seen with impressive lucidity in
his first monograph (Reichenbach, 1920), general covariance
implies the ‘‘relativity of coordinates’’ and not the ‘‘relativity of
geometry’’, not the freedom of choosing among different geome-
tries, but the freedom of expressing the same geometry in
different coordinate systems. As Reichenbach had rightly put it,
it is true that ‘‘the four space–time coordinates can be chosen
arbitrarily, but that the ten metric functions gmn may not be
assumed arbitrarily; they have definite values for every choice of
coordinates’’ (Reichenbach, 1920, 86; tr. 1965, 90). As we just
mentioned, the gmn are univocally determined by field equations,
but of course only up to four arbitrary functions. However, ‘‘this
indeterminacy [Unbestimmtheit]’’ (Reichenbach, 1920, 96–97; tr.
1965, 102; my emphasis) does not reflect any lack of univocality
of the geometrical structure of the world: ‘‘There exist depen-
dency relations among the metric coefficients, and if four of them
are arbitrarily given for the whole space, then the other six are
determined by transformation formulas’’ (Reichenbach, 1920, 96–
97; tr. 1965, 102; my emphasis). Even if Reichenbach did not
provide further details, as we have seen, the presence of such
‘‘redundancy’’ in the mathematical apparatus was precisely the
‘‘philosophical’’ problem that the point-coincidence argument
was meant to solve: solutions of the field equations that differ
only by a coordinate transformation, as Weyl put it, ‘‘represent
the same objective course of the world’’ (Weyl, 1918, 190; tr. 1922,
237).
As is well known, Reichenbach’s promising line of reasoning
unfortunately did not survive the exchange of a few letters with
Schlick (on this topic see Parrini, 2005). The ‘‘conventionalist’’
interpretation of the point-coincidence argument rapidly became
the ‘‘official’’ reading defended by early Logical Empiricism. In the
commentaries to Helmholtz’s epistemological writings, which
Schlick edited with Paul Hertz8 in 1921 (Helmholtz, 1921), he
could attempt to interpret even Helmholtz’s celebrated convex-
mirror thought experiment (Helmholtz, 1870) as a precursor to
Einstein’s point-coincidence argument. Whatever pairs of objects
are congruent in our world must be congruent in its distorted
mirror image, Helmholtz had argued, and no decision can be
made about which one is the undistorted world (cf. DiSalle, 2006,
82ff.). ‘‘Helmholtz’ proposition—Schlick comments—can there-
fore be extended to the truth that no occurrences whatsoever can
be ascertained physically other than meetings of points, and from
this Einstein has logically drawn the conclusion that all physical
laws should contain only statements about such coincidences’’
(Schlick’s commentary in Helmholtz, 1921, 30, n. 39; tr. 1977,
34). Without any other sources of information, one must be
content considering the undistorted world as the one in which
‘‘much simpler mechanics prevails’’ (Schlick’s commentary in
Helmholtz, 1921, 34, n. 46; tr. 1977, 35).
The impression that this is nothing more than the 1915
‘‘Kretschmannian’’ version of the point-coincidence argument
becomes hard to resist by reading Rudolph Carnap’s dissertation,
finished before February 1921 under the supervision of the neo-
Kantian Bruno Bauch (Gabriel, 2004). Carnap made one last step
in philosophers’ unwitting re-appropriation of Kretschmann’s
argument by explicitly labeling the point-coincidences as ‘‘topo-
logical’’ properties, a parlance that would become standard
among the logical empiricists in the following years: ‘‘Only
space–time encounter (‘‘coincidence’’) [Zusammenfallen (‘‘Koinzi-
denz’’)] is physically established [feststellbar] y Hence only
topological determinations are univocal [eindeutig]’’ (Carnap,
1922, 83; note to page 39ff.). Carnap of course mentions Einstein’s
1916 review paper (Einstein, 1916) among his sources (together
7 As we have mentioned in Section 3 also Kretschmann had attended Riehl’s
lectures in Berlin. 8 Of course the same Paul Hertz we have mentioned earlier on p. 7.
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with Schlick, 1920). Interestingly, he also mentions the positivist
Joseph Petztold, who expressly linked Einstein’s language of
coincidences and Mach’s reduction of scientific knowledge to
‘‘coincidences of perceptions’’ (Petzoldt, 1921, 64). Of course,
a reference to Poincare´ (1906b) here could not be lacking
(Carnap, 1922, 83; note to page 39ff.).
If Carnap sought to illuminate the meaning of Einstein’s point-
coincidence argument by resorting, directly or indirectly, to Mach
and Poincare´’s authority, it is all but surprising that he ended up
producing the exact replica of Kretschmann’s 1915 line of reason-
ing: ‘‘the content [Inhalt] of the experiential statement is
unchangeable (invariant) under one-to-one continuous space
mappings (transformations)’’, but ‘‘this holds for topological state-
ments and for these only’’; non-topological determinations, e.g.
projective and metrical relations, ‘‘do not remain unchanged
against those space mappings. They are therefore not pure
statements of a factual basis, but depend on form determined
by choice [von wahlbestimmter Form]’’ (Carnap, 1922, 39).
If one puts aside Carnap’s still ‘‘Kantian’’ framework
(Mormann, 2009), this rapidly becomes the logical empiricists’
customary reading of Einstein’s general covariance requirement.
In his 1921–1922 review article, Der gegenwa¨rtige Stand der
Relativita¨tsdiskussion, Reichenbach explains that when ‘‘Einstein
established the general theory, he regarded the fact that, in
principle, only coincidences of physical things are observable as an
essential premise’’. General relativity—Reichenbach conti-
nues—‘‘considers coincidences as the only invariants, and relati-
vizes merely the metrical relations between the coincidences’’
(Reichenbach, 1922a, 332, tr. 1978, I, 15, my emphasis). This
remark—inserted in passing in the context of a polemic against
Josef Petzold’s ‘‘machian’’ reading of the notion of coincidence
(Petzoldt, 1921, 64)—clearly shows Reichenbach now took for
granted that in general relativity the ‘‘metrical relations between
the coincidences’’ are not preserved by a general coordinate
transformation (Reichenbach, 1921, 332, tr. 1978, I, 15).
Reichenbach (unfortunately) had come to reject his previous
claim that ‘‘only with regard to the arbitrariness of the co-ordinates
is space an ideal structure; the metric, however, expresses an objective
property of reality’’ (Reichenbach, 1922a, 356; tr. 1978, I, 34f.; my
emphasis). He now claims that ‘‘[t]his conception does not contra-
dict conventionalism’’. Since ‘‘a metric emerges only after the
physical laws have been established’’—he writes—then ‘‘one can
also change the metric, provided one changes the laws of physics
correspondingly. But the relation between these modifications
expresses an invariant fact’’ (Reichenbach, 1922a, 356; tr. 1978, I,
34f.; my emphasis) which, of course, is represented precisely by the
infamous point-coincidences.
Kretschmann’s 1917/1918 paper should have made clear that
the point-coincidence argument should actually be read in the
context of the work of Ricci and Levi-Civita: transformations
preserving coincidences are considered in as much as they do
not change the metric, but only its mathematical expression in a
different coordinate system. However, Kretschmann’s second
paper had gone nearly unnoticed. In a letter to Reichenbach on
27 March 1922, Einstein—by sending the drafts of his review
article back to Reichenbach—specifically lamented the absence of
any reference to Kretschmann in the paper. Kretschmann, who in
1920 had become Privatdozent in Ko¨nigsberg (Habe, 1955,
647)—was in fact ‘‘highly esteemed by Einstein’’ (Arnold Som-
merfeld to Henry A. Erikson 13. Oktober 1922).9
On 2 May, Reichenbach wrote to Schlick: ‘‘Einstein wrote me
that I should also have mentioned Kretzschmann [sic]’’. But he
openly admitted: ‘‘I am however not very clear about the meaning
of Kretzschmann’s [sic] objection and must first still correspond
with Einstein about that’’ (Schlick & Reichenbach, 1920–1922).
We do not know if this exchange ever took place. However,
Kretschmann’s second paper would have clearly showed the
misunderstanding behind the metrical conventionalism that
Reichenbach had by that time fully implemented in his philoso-
phical writings (Reichenbach, 1922b): general covariance does
not imply at all that we can choose any kind of geometry we
please by changing the physical laws. What it does imply is that
we can express the very same physical laws by using any kind of
coordinate system we please.
8.1.1. Logical empiricism and Kretschmann’s conventionalism
If our reconstruction is correct, we have to confront an
uncomfortable but simple truth: the early logical empiricists
misread Einstein’s 1916 point-coincidence argument as though
it were Kretschmann’s 1915 point-coincidence argument. Conse-
quently, they were led to believe that the essential feature of
general relativity is that the metric relations—the lengths of
world-lines—do not remain invariant under a deformation of
space–time that preserves point-coincidences. The mistake of this
reasoning is easy to glean, and is rather crude. As Arthur Stanley
Eddington famously put it, general-relativistic space–time ‘‘is not
a lot of points close together, it is a lot of distances interlocked’’
(Eddington, 1923, 10). Distances do remain invariant under a
transformation that is accompanied by the suitable change of the
coefficients gmn. Of course, this is the relevant point of the
requirement of general covariance. It is precisely why Kretsch-
mann, in 1917, did not attribute any physical content to this
requirement.
Having failed to recognize that Einstein had inserted Kretsch-
mann’s language of coincidences into a different tradition, it is
after all not surprising that the logical empiricists ended up
repeating Kretschmann’s early epistemological reflections. Cur-
iously, this did not escape the attention of some of their
contemporaries. Oskar Becker, in his 1922 Habilitationsschrift,
Beitra¨ge zur pha¨nomenologischen Begru¨ndung der Geometrie und
ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen—published on Jahrbuch fu¨r
Philosophie und pha¨nomenologische Forschung (Becker, 1923),
when he became Husserl’s assistant—presented Kretschmann’s
1915 paper as the clearest expression of conventionalism:
In order to characterize more precisely this view [convention-
alism], we give here an overview of Kretschmann’s work. Each
measurement of spatiotemporal quantities is carried out by
bringing the measuring instrument into superposition with
parts of the object to be measured. Only the coincidence
[Zusammenfallen] of parts of the measuring instrument
with parts of the object measured can be observed; these are
purely topological relations between two spatiotemporal
objects (y 1). Accordingly all topologically identical mappings
[Abbildungen] of the phenomenal world are equivalent [gleich-
berechtigt] (y 4). The spatiotemporal reference-system of
physics is a four-dimensional number-manifold with undeter-
mined (!) metrical structure [Maßbestimmung] (y 5). Through
observations and the mapping-postulate alone no specific
measure-determinations [Maßbestimmungen] between
spatiotemporal coordinates are given. y Non-topological,
kinematic properties of a physical system of laws are mere
conventions (!).
In this way the non-topological physical statements do not
lose their scientific value. They are downgraded to formula-
tions of topological laws valid for the ‘‘economy of thought’’.
This however has downright devastating consequences for
9 Deutsches Museum Mu¨nchen, Archiv, Archiv NL 89, 019, Mappe 4,1; http://
sommerfeld.userweb.mwn.de/KurzFass/03996.html
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the very content [Bestand] of theoretical physics! (Becker,
1923, 525).
Becker’s indignant rejection of Kretschmann’s conventionalism—
emphatically laden with exclamation marks—was clearly inspired
by Weyl (with whom Becker was in correspondence, cf.: Mancosu
& Ryckman, 2002, 2005). In those years, Weyl, more than
anyone else, had insisted on the ‘‘devastating consequences’’ of
reducing—as Schlick actually did—the ‘‘four-dimensional world’’
to an arbitrarily deformable ‘‘mass of plasticine’’ (Weyl, 1924,
198). The philosophical achievement of general relativity cer-
tainly does not consist in having discovered the conventionality of
every non-topological space–time structure, but instead in having
transformed it into a ‘‘structure-field [Strukturfeld]’’ (Weyl, 1931,
338), which is just as real as the electromagnetic field (Weyl,
1924, 198).
Unfortunately, it was precisely the ‘‘Kretschmannian’’ conven-
tionalism described by Becker that became the official logical-
empiricist philosophy of space and time. In his 1924 Axiomatik der
relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1924), Reichen-
bach, after again having rejected the positivistic blurring of
subjective and objective coincidences (Reichenbach, 1924, 14;
tr. 1969, 19), explicitly maintains that ‘‘space and time in the
General Theory of Relativity mean the same as in the special
theory although without any metric’’ (Reichenbach, 1924, 155; tr.
1969, 195; my emphasis); the ‘‘topological properties turn out to
be more constant that the metrical one’’, so that Reichenbach
famously argues that ‘‘the transition from the special theory to
the general one represents merely a renunciation of metrical
characteristics, while the fundamental topological character of
space and time remains the same’’ (Reichenbach, 1924, 155;
tr. 1969, 195, my emphasis).
Without underestimating the substantial divergences between
Schlick’s Vienna Circle and the emerging Berlin group gathered
around Reichenbach, a common tendency can at least be recog-
nized in the philosophy of space and time (cf. Ryckman, 2007,
200–207): if Schlick still defended his ‘‘method of coincidences’’
in the second expanded edition of his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre
(Schlick, 1925), Carnap, in his first post-doctoral writings (Carnap,
1923, 1925), could easily translate his early ‘‘Kantian’’ conven-
tionalism into an empiricist framework.
Reichenbach’s monograph, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
(Reichenbach, 1928)—which, as a letter from Reichenbach to
Schlick (cited in Schlick, 2006, vol. 6, 175) reveals, was already
finished in 1926—classically summed up the logical empiricists’
reading of general relativity in the well-known theories of
‘‘equivalent descriptions’’ and the ‘‘relativity of geometry’’: we
are free to choose among topologically equivalent, but physically
different metric spaces that can be smoothly deformed into one
another by universal ‘‘forces’’ (such as gravitation) ‘‘preserving
coincidences’’ (Reichenbach, 1928, 37; tr. 1958, 27). Reichen-
bach’s line of reasoning is well summarized by the following
passage: ‘‘The coordinate system assigns to the system of coin-
cidences, of point-events, a mutual order that is independent of any
metric. This order of coincidences must therefore be understood
as an ultimate fact’’ (Reichenbach, 1928, 337; tr. 1958, 287; my
emphasis).
In 1926 Reichenbach obtained a teaching position in ‘‘natural
philosophy’’ at the University of Berlin (Hecht & Hoffmann,
1982)—thanks to Einstein’s intervention. In the same year
Kretschmann became professor extraordinarius at the University
of Ko¨nigsberg (Habe, 1955, 647). Although in the meantime
he had published other technical works on relativity (e.g.
Kretschmann, 1920, 1924), his interests seem to have moved to
quantum mechanics (see for instance his 1929 popular lecture
published as Kretschmann, 1930). However, he does not seem to
have noticed the enormous success that his point-coincidence
argument—although under false pretenses—enjoyed in the phi-
losophical community.
Karl Popper’s 1929 Axiome, Definitionen und Postulate der
Geometrie (Popper, 1929)—a scholarly survey on the state of the
art in philosophy of geometry—disappointingly shows that few
steps had been made by philosophers of science beyond Kretsch-
mann’s first version of the argument:
The possibility of interpreting the experience differently is
based on the fact that the metric [Maßsetzung] or the type of
geometry [Geometrieart] can be chosen freely.
Even in the non-metrical projective geometry there is a
moment that is completely analogous to that of the determi-
nation of the metric [Maßsetzung]y
The case of the topology is different. Here every metrical
moment is completely turned off [ausgeschaltet]. There is
therefore no way to interpret the experience.
This is the reason why the topological finding [topologische
Befund] can truly be considered as the finding [Befund] of the
corresponding [jeweiligen] uninterpreted ‘‘facts of the spatial
experience’’ [des yTatbestandes der ra¨umlichen Erfahrung]
y
The propositions of applied topology must therefore be
regarded as empirical propositions valid (without any further
limitation) a posteriori.
The relationship between space points that is relevant
to topology is that of the infinitesimal neighborhood or
coincidence.
The coincidence of space-elements is the only distinctive
[ausgezeichnete] uninterpreted geometrical fact of experience
that can exist between space-elements (It follows that the
notion of coincidence [Koinzidenzbegriff] has special episte-
mological significance for a possible physics that proceeds as a
hypothesis-free, strictly empirical physics) (Popper, 1929, now
in Popper, 2006, 376f.).
If this passage provides a good summary of Schlick, Reichenbach,
and Carnap’s epistemology of geometry—from whose writing the
young Popper abundantly draws—then the mature philosophy of
space and time of perhaps the most influential movements in the
history of philosophy of science appears to be disarmingly
unimpressive. Nothing significant has been added, and no more
sophisticated philosophical consequence has been drawn than
what a young Ph.D. student of Planck’s had suggested more than a
decade earlier.
9. Conclusion
After the war, Kretschmann continued his career in East
Germany as a professor of theoretical physics at the Martin-
Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg (Habe, 1955, 647). Most of
the European adherents of Logical Empiricism had moved to the
United States in the second half of the 1930s, and had essentially
abandoned their interest in relativity.
In his famous contribution (Reichenbach, 1949) to the Library
of Living Philosopher’s volume in Einstein’s honor (Schilpp, 1949),
Reichenbach still regarded the theory of relativity’s most signifi-
cant achievement as the ‘‘discovery’’ that space–time has
no intrinsic metrical structure, but only a topological one
(Reichenbach, 1949). It has of course become an easy move to
refute this reading by resorting to Einstein’s last pronouncement
about his own theory, which was published shortly thereafter:
if we imagine the metric structure to be removed—Einstein
famously claimed—there remains ‘‘absolutely nothing, and also
no ‘topological space’’’ (Einstein, 1952, 155).
M. Giovanelli / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (2013) 115–134130
Author's personal copy
As we have tried to show, one of the main reasons for this
substantial failure must be located in the logical-empiricists’
irresistible inclination to read Einstein’s point-coincidence argu-
ment in the form Kretschmann had originally formulated it.
Whereas Einstein had taken nothing from Kretschmann but the
expression ‘‘point-coincidences’’, the logical empiricists instinc-
tively dragged along with it the entire apparatus of Kretsch-
mann’s conventionalism.
The logical empiricists probably never stumbled onto Kretsch-
mann’s paper; they simply drew from the same philosophical
tradition Kretschmann was familiar with, a tradition dominated
by authors such as Poincare´ and Mach. Einstein’s coincidence
parlance, then, appeared to provide convincing evidence for
considering general relativity as the last heir of such a tradition
(cf. Frank, 1949); it was the crowning moment of a process that
progressively impoverished physically significant mathematical
structure, which was finally reduced to the topological or mani-
fold structure of number quadruples, that is, the space–time
coincidences. It is impossible to make an empirically founded
choice between physically different geometries that agree on such
coincidences, which is the only structure that experience can
univocally determine. Carnap’s 1956 preface to the English
translation of Reichenbach’s monograph (Reichenbach, 1958)
shows that he still considers this to be the main achievement of
the book (cf. also Martin Gardner’s typescript of Carnap’s 1958
seminar on the foundation of physics published as Carnap,
1966).
As we have seen, however, if Einstein did deftly steal the
point-coincidence argument from Kretschmann’s paper, he used
it to solve a problem that emerged from a completely different
tradition: one which came from the work of Riemann and
Christoffel and culminated in Ricci and Levi-Civita’s classic 1900
paper (Levi-Civita & Ricci-Curbastro, 1900). By inserting Kretsch-
mann’s turn of phrase into this context, Einstein was led to a
somehow specular result: different solutions of the field equa-
tions that differ only by a coordinate transformation appear
mathematically distinct, but actually represent the very same
physical situation, since they agree on point coincidences, which
are the only observables.
It was Peter Bergmann—Einstein’s assistant at Princeton since
1936—and his school, who, in the mid-1950s, re-discovered a
notion of ‘‘coincidence’’ that was more akin to Einstein’s, by
discussing the problem of ‘true observables’ in general relativity
(Bergmann, 1956). General covariance—as Bergmann’s post-doc
student Arthur Komar put it—forces us to accept that ‘‘the
potentials of the gravitational field, as a function of these
coordinates’’ are not observable. Consequently, ‘‘[g]iven two
metric tensor fields, one cannot readily tell whether they repre-
sent two distinct physical situations or whether they represent the
same physical situation but in two different coordinate systems’’
(Komar, 1958, 1182; my emphasis).
In order to ‘‘remove the ambiguity engendered by general
covariance’’ (Komar, 1958, 1182), Komar suggested using the four
non-vanishing invariants of the Riemann tensor in empty space–
times to individuate the points of space–time (cf. Stachel, 1993,
for a more recent appraisal of this method). In the generic case,
where no symmetries are present, the four scalars Ai that ‘‘one is
able to construct by combining the metric tensor, the Riemann
tensor, and its covariant derivative, will in general have different
values at different world points’’ (Komar, 1958, 1182). The value
of the gravitational potentials gik at a certain world-point where
the coordinates xi have certain values is not an observable, for the
identification of a world-point by means of coordinate values
depends on the choice of coordinates. On the contrary, the
value of the potentials gik at a certain world-point where the
four non-vanishing invariants of the Riemann tensor Ai have
certain values is an observable, since this information does not
depend on the choice of coordinates (Komar, 1958, 1183).
Such ‘‘Komar events’’ (Earman, 2002, Section 5) must then be
regarded as the natural heir of Einstein’s notion of ‘‘coincidence’’
(Bergmann, 1961), namely, the coincidences of the values of the
metric tensor field gik and of the scalar field Ai (Bergmann &
Komar, 1960; cf. Bergmann, 1968, Sections 21 & 23 for a popular
presentation). Curiously, this notion of coincidence also bears a
subtle relation to Kretschmann’s work. As we have briefly men-
tioned (see Section 6), Kretschmann was the first to resort to four
invariants of the Riemann tensor to individuate the points of
space–time with invariant labels (the so-called Kretschmann–
Komar coordinates). It is of course this notion of coincidence that
has become relevant in the modern debate.
General relativity does reveal the existence of a ‘‘class of
equivalent descriptions’’ (Reichenbach, 1951) of different physical
situations, that is, different possible physical geometries that
agree only in coincidences, as Reichenbach—who was curiously
in contact with Einstein’s other Princeton assistant, Valentine
Bargmann (cf. Reichenbach, 1944, vii)—believed. On the contrary,
general covariance has a physical meaning in as much as it
shows, as Bergmann put it, that there is an ‘‘equivalence class of
solutions’’ that describes the ‘‘same physical situation’’ (Bergmann,
1961), since they agree on coincidences.
As is well known, in the current coordinate-free parlance this
means that general-relativistic space–time is ‘‘not just one pair
ðM,gÞ but a whole equivalence class of all pairs ðM0,g0Þ which are
equivalent to ðM,gÞ’’ (Hawking & Ellis, 1973, 56). It was precisely
the worrisome presence of these redundant, non-physical degrees
of freedom that Einstein was able to exorcize by resorting to
Kretschmann’s turn of phrase. A space–time corresponds to a
gravitational field; but a gravitational field corresponds to an
equivalence class of space–times. ‘‘This is the true significance of
the concept of general covariance, as Peter Bergmann among
others has long known’’ (Stachel, 1987, 203).
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